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Abstract 
Basic income is a radical idea which has gained more attention in many countries in recent 
years, as traditional welfare states are having trouble solving the problems they were created 
to solve. Basic income promises to solve many of these problems in an effective and simple 
way. The purpose of this thesis is to study basic income in a way which can supplement the 
existing literature, and make it relevant in a Norwegian perspective. Hopefully this can 
contribute towards placing basic income on the political agenda and in the public debate. A 
large amount of literature is written on basic income, but by comparing the arguments used to 
promote a basic income with empirical data from previously implemented social policy in 
Norway, I hope to contribute towards an area which is not well covered.  
To do this I identify the arguments used to promote a basic income, and compare them to the 
arguments used to promote other universal social policy in Norway at the time they were 
introduced. The empirical cases of the universal child benefit and the universal old age 
pension in Norway has been chosen, because they resemble a basic income in many ways. 
The study is of a qualitative nature, and the method of document analysis is used to conduct 
the study. The data material for basic income is mainly scholarly literature. The data materials 
used for the analysis of the child benefit scheme and the old age pension are government 
documents, mainly preparatory work for new laws, legal propositions put forward in 
parliament, white papers, and transcripts of debates in parliament.  
This study finds that there are many similarities between the three social policies studied in 
this thesis. Most clearly the arguments are similar in two areas: arguments related to economic 
and administrative considerations, and arguments related to poverty and social justice. The 
main differences are related to arguments related to freedom and justice, and arguments 
related to feminist, green and post-productive considerations.  
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“Such a comprehensive reform [NIT] would do more efficiently and humanely what our 
present welfare system does so inefficiently and inhumanely. It would provide an assured 
minimum to all persons in need regardless of the reasons for their need while doing as little 
harm as possible to their character, their independence, or their incentive to better their own 
condition”  (Friedman & Friedman 1980: 120). 
- Milton Friedman, 
Free to Choose 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980’s a simple and powerful idea has been acquiring support and admiration from 
a growing number of people, especially in Europe, but also in other parts of the world 
(Widerquist, Noguera, Vanderborght & De Wispelaere 2013). The idea of a universal basic 
income is that every citizen or resident of a country receives a modest income without means 
testing or conditions attached, and let them top it up at will. It can be seen as a radical reform 
of the welfare state (Bay & Pedersen 2006), and it is by many seen as a solution to many of 
the problems with existing welfare- and social policies (Van Parijs 2004b). Political 
philosophers have discussed the idea of basic income for decades, but amongst politicians, the 
debate has been mostly untouched. Basic income is said to fulfil the liberal arguments for 
social justice with concerns such as freedom, efficiency and equality (Meade 1993), it is said 
to fulfil libertarian justice (Vallentyne 2012), and it is argued to fulfil the requirements of 
republican freedom for everyone (Domènech & Raventós 2007). Basic income has also been 
presented in more practical terms as a solution to problems facing modern welfare stares, like 
problems with high unemployment rates (Van Parijs 1995), poverty,  the negative effects of 
means testing and the difficulties distinguishing between deserving poor and non-deserving 
poor in categorical social insurance (Goodin 2001a). It has however in recent years gained 
more attention in some European countries (Offe 2009) as the welfare states of European 
countries are facing problems regarding mass unemployment among young people (Lachman 
2013, The Economist 2013).  
The aim of this thesis is to look at basic income from a Norwegian perspective. To identify 
and systematically analyse the arguments in favour of a basic income, and find potential 
differences and similarities to the debates in Norway concerning other universal and 
unconditional  benefits. For this purpose, the child benefit and the old age pension are also 
included in the study1(Folketrygdloven , Barnetrygdloven). The research question for the 
thesis is as follows: What are the arguments used to promote a universal basic income, and 
how do they compare to the arguments leading to the introduction of other universal income 
schemes in Norway? 
This thesis will explore the literature on basic income to get a good understanding of the basic 
income debate. It will also have a historical view on the debates surrounding the passing of 
the universal child benefit from 1946 (Pettersen 1987: 97), and the national old age pension 
from 1936, which was made universal in 1957 (Pettersen 1987: 27). I will discuss the 
                                                          
1
 Apart from the age restrictions, the child benefit and the basic old age pension are unconditional and universal.  
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theoretical debate on basic income, found in the literature, and empirically study the debates 
from the introduction of the mentioned social policies in Norway. Parliamentary debates, 
party programs and different types of government documents make up the data material.  
1.1 Why study basic income? 
The idea of basic income is by no means a new one, in fact it has been independently thought 
up under a variety of different names and forms for many years, but in most cases without 
much political success. In the 1920’s it was brought up in Britain, but lost ground to the 
Beveridge plan in the 40’s (Widerquist et al. 2013). In the United States it enjoyed popularity 
in the 60’s, and was even put forward by a presidential candidate, but lost attention along with 
the candidate. For the last two or three decades, it has again started to get attention in Europe, 
and is now more popular than ever before. The Basic Income Earth Network has gained 
affiliate organisations in many countries, the latest additions are from 2012, when the Belgian, 
Finnish, Slovenian and Norwegian affiliate organizations were accepted (Basic Income Earth 
Network 2011, Basic Income News 2012, BIEN 2013). There is a European Citizens Initiative 
under way to bring basic income on the EU agenda (European Comission 2013), and there has 
been a successful campaign in Switzerland, who is due to have a petition on basic income 
sometime in the next three years (BIEN Switzerland 2013).  
All research projects should “ ... pose a question that is “important” in the real world.” (King, 
Keohane & Verba 1994: 15). This means that the topic should have consequences for political, 
social or economic life, or for understanding something that affects many people’s lives. The 
topic of basic income does this by being a current proposal for a radical reform of welfare 
states in Europe, and even for the European Union as a whole.  Although there is currently no 
public debate about basic income in Norway, the debate is very active in other European 
countries, even other Nordic countries. Although  it has only received serious attention in 
Denmark and Finland  (Andersson & Kangas 2005: 114), it could eventually become a more 
popular topic in Norway. The newly started basic income advocate group Borgerlønn – BIEN 
Norge (BIEN Norge 2013) whose purpose is to promote basic income and place it on the 
political agenda is an example that people in Norway are taking notice of basic income and 
that support is growing.    
The Nordic countries are known for their universal social policy, and this trait often 
characterizes the generous Nordic welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990, Rothstein 1998, 
Andersson et al. 2005). Universalism in this context means that citizenship or, rather, 
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residency is the condition for receiving social security. This is different from the Conservative 
welfare states, where welfare benefits often are attached to labour market position, or the 
liberal welfare states, where social security is given on the basis of need (Esping-Andersen 
1990, Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). However, even in the Nordic countries social 
security is conditional in several ways. To receive a benefit, the recipient must be unable to 
work, must be willing to accept a suitable job or training, pass a means test, the recipients 
household situation must be checked, and the level of the benefit may vary depending upon 
where a person lives (Andersson et al. 2005: 112).  This state of affairs deviates from the 
universalistic ideal. The most universalistic response to a situation where not everyone is able 
to provide for him- or herself would be an unconditional basic income.  
Two welfare programs in Norway today resemble a basic income, in the sense that they are 
regarded to be both universal and unconditional. This is the minimum old-age pension, and 
the child benefit. The child benefit program benefits all families with children up to the age of 
18. The old-age pension benefits all Norwegian citizens over the age of 67. The child-benefit 
program was the first welfare program in Norway without a means test, making it the first 
unconditional social program. The bill was passed in 1946, unanimously and without debate 
in the legislature (Kuhnle 1991). This marked a shift in the Norwegian welfare system, 
towards a more inclusive and encompassing welfare model. The old age pension was made 
unconditional in 1957, after many years of gradually improving the coverage of the means 
tested pension (Pettersen 1987).  
A research question should further make “a specific contribution to an  identifiable scholarly 
literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of 
some aspect of the world”(King et al. 1994: 15). The contribution of a single research project 
can be mainly a descriptive inference, not all research has to be causal (King et al. 1994). This 
thesis will contribute to the scholarly literature on basic income, especially in a Norwegian 
context. Firstly, a systematic review of the basic income idea can help create a better 
understanding of a complex topic, with a very large and varied scholarly literature. Second, it 
can contribute towards placing basic income in relation to existing Norwegian social policy, 
identifying similarities and differences. By identifying and systematically analysing the 
arguments used in the basic income debate, and comparing those to empirical cases from 
previous Norwegian debates on social policies, it could ultimately help create an 
understanding of the possibility, likelihood or desirability of basic income in Norway, and 
contribute towards placing it on the political agenda.  
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1.2 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 discusses the method and data materials used in this thesis. First, I specify the 
limitation of the units of analysis. I account for the data, and for the data collection process. I 
end the chapter with a discussion of the choice of method, and a discussion regarding 
evaluation of the data and methods used.  
Chapter 3 presents the basic income idea. The chapter starts with an introduction to the topic, 
providing definitions and then explaining the contents in detail. I identify and classify the 
arguments in favour of basic income, and the most common objections to basic income.  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to an analysis of the Norwegian child benefit scheme. I present a 
history of the idea and the discussion leading to the implementation of the program. I provide 
an in depth presentation and analysis of the process which led to the bill passing in 1946, and 
the debates preceding it.  
In chapter 5, I present the historical process leading up to the implementation of the 
Norwegian old age pension scheme. The focus is on the debates leading to the removal of the 
means test in 1956.  
Chapter 6 contains a comparison of the arguments identified in chapter 3, 4, and 5. I provide a 
summary and comparison of the results from the previous chapters in table form, as well as a 
discussion of the arguments.  
In chapter 7, I end this thesis with a conclusion, as well as some thoughts about the 
contributions of the thesis and suggestions for future research.  
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2. Data and method 
The goal of this thesis is to identify and compare arguments from scholarly and political 
debates surrounding three social policy proposals. The objects of study are the basic income 
proposal, which has not been implemented fully anywhere yet, the child benefit and the old-
age pension schemes in Norway. The Norwegian parliament passed the child benefit act in 
1946, and made the old age pension unconditional in 1957. What was the reason for passing 
these two unconditional social policies? Moreover, what are there similarities between the 
two, and the basic income debate? There is no right answer as to how to go about a study, 
collect data and come to a conclusion, but a research design will be helpful to guide the 
research (Johannessen, Tufte & Christoffersen 2010: 73). There are many different ways of 
conducting research, but some methods are more appropriate for certain kinds of study.  
The first question which surfaces is if the study is going to be a quantitative or a qualitative 
research project(Johannessen et al. 2010: 31), or even a mixed methods research project (King 
et al. 1994). The choice of methods is dependent upon the research question and is determined 
by the type of data which is collected for analysis (Grønmo 2004: 123). Data which is based 
on numbers or quantifiable evidence is often categorized as quantitative data, while data 
which is not quantifiable, such as interview data,  is often categorized as qualitative (Grønmo 
2004). There is no clear divide and different kinds of data can be used in both qualitative and 
quantitative research but data expressed in text form is usually most relevant for qualitative 
research (Grønmo 2004: 124). All data used in this thesis is in the form of text, scholarly 
literature and different kinds of documents. To best answer the research question with the 
available data, I have chosen a qualitative content analysis approach, or document analysis. 
2.1  Specifying the units of analysis 
To be able to do a qualitative study bound by the limits in time and resources of a master’s 
thesis, it is necessary to limit the scope of the study to make it manageable. The main theme 
of the thesis is the debate around the basic income idea, in a Norwegian perspective. To make 
it relevant in a Norwegian perspective, I want to compare it to previous debates in Norway on 
similar topics. The child benefit and the old age pension in Norway can be regarded as a form 
of basic income for specific groups of the population. The programmes have been chosen as 
units of analysis because of their similarities with basic income. The other units of analysis in 
this thesis are therefore the debates surrounding the passing of the child benefit program, and 
the debate leading to the removal of the means test in the old age pension. The study of the 
basic income debate relies on the scholarly literature on the topic. The empirical studies of the 
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debates on the child benefit and the old age pension uses data such as government documents 
and parliamentary records. The main data material consists of preparatory work, propositions, 
white papers, transcripts and records from debates in parliament.   
2.2 Data  
This thesis has three units of analysis, the first is the basic income debate, the second is the 
child benefit debate, and the third is the old age pension debate. The data material for the part 
on basic income is limited to the scholarly literature on the topic, found in books, journals, 
articles as well as internet-based sources. This section will be partially a literature review, but 
the contents of the literature will be systematically interpreted and categorized, following the 
method of document analysis. The sources for the child benefit debate and the old age pension 
debate are government documents. Mainly the sources are limited to preparatory work for 
new laws, legal propositions put forward in parliament, white papers, and transcripts of 
debates in parliament. These documents have partly collected from publications at the 
University Library, and partly from the official website of parliament www.stortinget.no, 
where official documents are freely available.  
The topic of basic income has a very large amount of scholarly literature, so the data has been 
limited through a thorough selection. I have, however, provided different views and different 
perspectives from the basic income debates found in the literature, and in particular 
Widerquist et al. (2013) contains a good overview of the topic, as well as an impressive 
collection of articles and research, but also recommendations for further reading, and has 
helped me finding relevant literature. In addition, the website www.binews.org is regularly 
updated with basic income related research news. I have also received literature 
recommendations on basic income from email correspondence with Anja Askeland, leader of 
the Norwegian BIEN organization (BIEN Norge 2013), and Simon Birnbaum, researcher at 
the department of political science at Stockholm University, associate editor of Basic Income 
Studies and member of the International Advisory Board of the Basic Income Earth Network 
(BIEN). 
Regarding the documents on the child benefit and the old age pension programmes, I have 
received information regarding relevant documents from my supervisor Professor Stein 
Kuhnle, and email correspondence with historian and state grant recipient (Statsstipendiat) 
Per Haave. The process of reading the government documents also uncovered additional 
relevant documents to use. In addition, systematic searching in the database 
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www.arkivportalen.no, a national search engine for many national archives and catalogues has 
provided fruitful results.  
2.3 Document analysis 
Document analysis involves a systematic review of documents with the aim of categorizing 
the content, and registering the data that is relevant for answering the research question in the 
study (Grønmo 2004: 187, Mayring 2000). This method consists of systematically identifying 
and extracting relevant information with the aim of highlighting specific issues related to the 
research question. This can be e.g. what arguments, attitudes, beliefs or values which are 
presented in the documents (Grønmo 2004: 128). The relevant parts of the content are then 
processed, systematized and registered in a way which allows it to be used in the analysis 
(Grønmo 2004: 187). Especially relevant for this thesis are the arguments that can be found in 
the relevant documents. Content analysis can be conducted on any kind of data; pictures, 
sound, images, or text. Usually in document analysis the documents consist of text (Mayring 
2000), and this is also true for this research project.  
The data collection and data analysis processes are often overlapping, and the choice of 
documents sometimes happens during the data collection process. During the process of 
collecting and analysing documents, the researcher gets a better understanding of other 
documents, which can be relevant for answering the research question. The data collection 
process can therefore be unpredictable, and a detailed plan might not be useful, as the plans 
might change during the process  (Grønmo 2004: 187). This flexibility of the research design 
is a regular quality in qualitative research design, and it can be a resource for the research 
project. It can however cause the researcher to lose focus on the original purpose of the 
research project (Grønmo 2004: 130-131). Therefore, it is important in the preparation of the 
data collection process to decide on and clarify the focus and purpose of the research project.  
During the data collection process, it is important to take source-critical and contextual 
evaluations of the data. This requires evaluation of the documents’ availability, relevance, 
authenticity and credibility (Grønmo 2004: 190). An evaluation of the availability of the 
relevant documents must be done prior to the data collection process, but also during the 
process, because the possibility of adding additional documents may come up. The relevance 
of the documents is especially important, as these are the objects of study. It is also an 
important part of the systematic and thorough review of the documents, which is the data 
collection process. The relevance of the documents can also help determine the authenticity 
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and credibility of the documents as source material. The documents must be seen in their 
original context. By viewing the document in its original context, we can decide if a text is 
authentic and if the content is credible (Grønmo 2004: 190).   
The final part of the data collection process, which also overlaps with the analyses of the data, 
is extracting the relevant information from the documents. When the relevant information is 
identified and registered, the categorization can begin. This is where data collection and 
analysing the data most clearly overlaps. When different parts of the data are processed, 
grounds for categorizing it emerge. The overlapping of data collection and data analysis and 
selection of new documents all happen simultaneously. This allows the categories to be 
reviewed or altered as the data is collected and analysed (Grønmo 2004: 191-192). After this 
process is completed, it is time for the main analysis of the data as a whole.       
Figure 1: The data collection process in document analysis  
Preparation 
 Clarify focus of study.  
- Themes 
- Kinds of documents / texts 
 
 Find documents / texts  
 Evaluate availability 
 
2.4 Problems with document analysis  
One of the main problems arising in this type of analysis is that the researcher’s perspective 
can influence the selection and the interpretation of the data material (Grønmo 2004: 192). A 
narrow perspective can lead to the data selection can be skewed, and the interpretation of the 
data can be one sided. This can be a problem because documents that are relevant for the 
research question can be left out, because their contents do not fit the researcher’s perspective.  
Another problem regarding document analysis is that the researcher's source-critical 
understanding can be flawed (Grønmo 2004: 192), and the interpretation of the data can be 
affected by this. The researcher can end up basing the research on documents that are not 
authentic or credible, which can lead to erroneous interpretations of the data material. Related 
to this, the authors understanding of the context in which the text was written can also lead to 
wrongful interpretations of it (Grønmo 2004).   
Data collection process 
 Review the documents systematically: 
- Source-critical and contextual evaluation 
- Identify and extract relevant data 
- Categorize relevant data 
 
 Identify and systematically review new 
documents 
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Assessing the relevance of the documents by systematically evaluating the contents of the 
documents from alternative perspectives can solve these problems. The researcher should 
evaluate the contents of the documents based on the context in which it was written, in order 
to avoid misinterpretations of the text. A critical assessment of the authenticity and credibility 
of the data material is also of paramount importance (Grønmo 2004: 192-193). This can be 
done by evaluating the content of the data in relation to other sources and existing knowledge, 
and the circumstances and context in which the text was written, and an assessment of the 
authors presumed intentions and meanings, social functions or the readers possible 
perceptions of the text (Grønmo 2004: 193).  
Interpretation is a central part of document analysis, and the researcher is active in all parts of 
the research project. Therefore, different aspects of the researcher can influence the 
interpretation in many ways. Personal traits, background and zeitgeist can influence the 
interpretation of the data (Johannessen et al. 2010). 
2.5 Evaluating the study 
In quantitative research projects, terms such as reliability and different forms of validity are 
used to control the data and methods used. Yin argues that the same terms should also be used 
for qualitative research (Yin 2009: 40). Guba & Lincoln on the other hand argue that 
qualitative studies have to be evaluated differently, and use credibility, dependability, 
transferability and confirmability to determine the quality of qualitative research (Guba & 
Lincoln 1981). Johannessen et al. (2010) argue that one should not choose either-or, but use 
different evaluation methods depending on what best suits the specific research project. 
Sometimes the validity and reliability used in quantitative studies can be useful also for 
qualitative studies, and other times other criteria can be useful (Johannessen et al. 2010: 229). 
Creswell (2013) also recommends using multiple validation strategies for qualitative research 
(Creswell 2013: 250). While Grønmo (2004) argues that even though different terms and 
strategies are sometimes used, the same kind of assessment of the data are required regardless 
of what strategy is used.   
2.5.1  Reliability (Dependability) 
Reliability is concerned with the data used in a research project. What type of data is 
collected, how the data is collected and how the data is used (Johannessen et al. 2010: 229). In 
quantitative research projects, reliability is critical. Reliability can be tested by doing the same 
study on the same control group at two different occasions. If the results are the same, the 
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reliability is good. This is known as test-retest reliability (Johannessen et al. 2010: 40). The 
reliability of a research project also increases if the results are closely matched by other 
researcher’s results on the same data material (Johannessen et al. 2010, Yin 2009, King et al. 
1994). The purpose of increasing reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in the study 
(Yin 2009: 45). 
In qualitative research, these measures are not always sufficient or appropriate. This is 
because it can be difficult for another researcher to get the same results in a qualitative study, 
because observations are often value-laden and contextual. The process of the data collection 
process is less structured than in quantitative studies (Grønmo 2004: 228). The researcher has 
his own values and experiences, and the interpretation of data can be very different for 
different researchers (Johannessen et al. 2010: 229). Thus, it is sometimes argued that 
reliability is not a good term for evaluating qualitative research, but rather use the term 
“dependability” (Guba & Lincoln 1989: 236-237).  
Even though different terms are sometimes used, the same kind of assessment of the data are 
required (Grønmo 2004). I chose to continue using the term “reliability”, which is commonly 
used in qualitative research (Creswell 2013, King et al. 1994). Documenting every step of the 
procedures used in a research project in detail can improve the reliability of qualitative 
research. This gives the reader a comprehensive description of the context, and an open and 
detailed presentation of the research process, this is what Yin calls a “case study protocol” 
(Yin 2009: 45). Another way for improving reliability in content analysis is to critically 
review the data material at different times or occasions(Grønmo 2004: 229). I have several 
times during this thesis reviewed the collected data materials, and I described every step of 
the process throughout the thesis to improve the reliability of the study.  
2.5.2 Validity 
Validity is regarded to be less precise, and more comprehensive than reliability (Grønmo 
2004: 231). King et al. (1994: 25) define validity as “measuring what we think we are 
measuring”. Regarding validity, there are some opposing views as to what is required in 
qualitative research. Grønmo argues that the validity of qualitative research can be evaluated 
using competence validity (kompetansevaliditet), communicative validity (kommunikativ 
validitet) or pragmatic validity (pragmatisk validitet). But internal validity, external validity 
and objectivity can also be used, and very often are in social science (Grønmo 2004: 234-
236). Yin (2009) and Johannessen et al. (2010) argue that internal and external validity are 
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also important in qualitative research, while Guba et al. (1989) use equivalents of internal and 
external validity, labelled “credibility” and “transferability”. I have chosen to follow 
Grønmo’s (2004: 234) recommendation to use the standard validity measures in social science 
research, which are internal validity, external validity and objectivity (Johannessen et al. 
2010).    
2.5.2.1 Internal validity (Credibility) 
Internal validity, or “credibility”, is a main problem for quantitative research. Does the data 
measure what it is supposed to measure? Under this definition, qualitative research cannot be 
valid, because the data often cannot be quantified and accurately measured (Johannessen et al. 
2010: 230). Internal validity can also be used to evaluate qualitative research, by determining 
if the data and methods used are relevant to answer the research question. The internal 
validity will be low if the data and methods used do not successfully comply with the purpose 
of the study and reflects reality (Grønmo 2004: 220-221). This is the only form of validity 
used by King et al. (1994).  
Qualitative research is characterized more by “depth” than by “width”, and can therefor 
potentially achieve high internal validity if it is performed correctly (Grønmo 1985: 128). The 
main area of study in this project is arguments. The arguments from basic income are derived 
from different authors writing about the subject, both from scholarly sources and from 
newspapers and internet articles. The arguments from the old age pension debate and the child 
benefit debate are gathered from government documents and parliamentary debates, as well as 
party programs and scholarly sources. Arguments do not “measure” anything, but they are all 
compliant with the research question of this thesis. I would characterize this study as “deep” 
and detailed, and would regard the internal validity of this study to be good.   
2.5.2.2 External validity (Transferability) 
External validity, or “transferability”, evaluates to what extent the results from a research 
project can be generalized to apply for a larger population, other cases, or if it is only 
applicable to the specific objects of research (Johannessen et al. 2010: 230). In quantitative 
research, the results can be statistically generalized, but this cannot be done with results from 
qualitative research. With regards to qualitative studies, some researchers would rather use the 
term “transferability” (Guba et al. 1989: 241). A study’s transferability depends on whether a 
description, term, interpretation, explanation or theory that can be used in other areas than the 
12 
 
one studied. The external validity of the results from this research project is low, as the results 
from this qualitative study can only account for these specific cases.  
2.5.2.3 Objectivity (confirmability) 
It is expected that researchers bring a unique perspective into the research they perform. But it 
is also important that the results are a result of the scientific research, and not a result of the 
researchers subjective beliefs (Johannessen et al. 2010: 232). This is the purpose of evaluating 
the objectivity, or the “confirmability” of a research project (Guba et al. 1989: 242). 
Objectivity is evaluated by testing to what degree the results of the research can be confirmed 
by other researchers doing a similar study? There are a few ways to secure objectivity during 
a research project. It is important that the researcher discloses and describes all decisions 
made during the research project, so that readers can follow and assess these. It is also 
important for the researcher to be self-critical to how the research is conducted, and disclose 
personal prejudice, experiences or other perceptions which can affect the interpretation or 
approach in the project (Guba et al. 1989: 243). The objectivity of a project can also be 
improved by evaluating if the interpretations or results can be collaborated by other literature, 
or if it is confirmed by the informants in the study  (Johannessen et al. 2010: 232).  
I consider the objectivity of this research project to be high. Because all the literature on basic 
income is readily available, and I have tried to include all the different viewpoints and 
arguments found in the literature. The other data, are empirical and historical, and regarding 
the child benefit and the old age pension, many similar results have been found in previous 
studies and projects (eg. Pettersen 1987, Hatland 1992, Hatland, Kuhnle & Romøren 2011).   
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“A certain small income, sufficient for necessities, should be secured for all, whether 
they work or not” (Russell 1919: 110) 
3. Basic income 
3.1 Introduction 
Basic income is the simple idea that everyone should receive a small income, to secure their 
most basic needs, and enable them to function properly in society. This idea is not a new idea; 
it has been around for a long time. Thomas Paine is believed to be one of the first proponents 
for a similar scheme when he in 1795 wrote: 
 “To create a National Fund, out of which there shall be paid to every person, 
when arrived at the age of twenty one years, the sum of fifteen pounds sterling, as 
a compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the 
introduction of the system of landed property: And also, the sum of ten pounds per 
annum, during life, to every person now living, of the age of fifty years, and to all 
others as they shall arrive at that age” (Paine 1797: 3). 
Many different people have proposed basic income in many different variants, for many 
years. It has often been brought up in some form in historical settings where unemployment, 
hunger, and poverty have become too extreme, and when the difference between rich and poor 
has become too large (Øyen 1981). Since about the 1960’s however, the literature on the 
subject has become vast. Basic income has become the topic of study of political science, 
sociology, philosophy, economics, psychology and other fields of research (Widerquist et al. 
2013).   
Basic income refers to a system of (re)distribution of capital to every citizen of a political 
community, often proposed financed through some form of taxation. Implementing a basic 
income can potentially cause major societal changes, and different groups will benefit, 
depending on how it is designed. Ideologically, basic income can be appealing to socialists 
and libertarians, as well as everyone in between. It may be appealing to different people for 
different reasons. To get into a more detailed discussion about basic income, it is necessary to 
provide a suitable definition.  
3.1.1 Definitions: 
Many different variants of basic income have been proposed through the years. Many of them 
are similar, so there is some consensus regarding what the main characteristics are. Here I will 
provide a few different definitions to clarify.  
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Maybe the most influential author on the subject, and founding member of the Basic Income 
Earth Network (BIEN), Philippe van Parijs, defines basic income as 
“An income paid by a government, at a uniform level and at regular intervals, 
to each adult member of society. The grant is paid, and its level is fixed, 
irrespective of whether the person is rich or poor, lives alone or with others, is 
willing to work or not. In most versions – certainly in mine – it is granted not 
only to citizens, but to all permanent residents” (Van Parijs 2001: 5). 
The Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), an international organization network for the 
promotion of basic income, defines basic income as follows: 
 “A basic income is an income unconditionally granted to all on an individual 
basis, without means test or work requirement. It is a form of minimum income 
guarantee that differs from those that now exist in various European countries 
in three important ways: 
- It is being paid to individuals rather than households 
- It is paid irrespective of any income from other sources 
- It is paid without requiring the performance of any work or the willingness to 
accept a job if offered” (Basic Income Earth Network 2011). 
Guy Standing, Co-Founder of BIEN, and Professor of Economic Security at the University of 
Bath, uses the following definition is his book from 2009:  
“The proposal is that every citizen, or legal resident, should have a right to 
receive a monthly basic income, either as a tax credit or a cash payment. It 
would be given to each person individually, regardless of age, marital status or 
work or labour status, and would be fully portable, being paid wherever the 
person was living in the country”(Standing 2009: 299). 
The Global Basic Income Foundation, who argue for a global basic income managed by the 
United Nations use this short and open definition: “a global basic income is a guaranteed 
minimum income that is given unconditionally to all people in all countries” (Global Basic 
Income Foundation 2011). 
15 
 
Daniel Raventós, professor at the University of Barcelona and advocate for basic income on 
the grounds of republican rights, defines basic income as follows:  
“Basic Income is an income paid by the state to each full member or accredited 
resident of a society, regardless of whether he or she wishes to engage in paid 
employment, or is rich or poor, in other words, independently of any other 
sources of income that person might have, and irrespective of cohabitation 
arrangements in the domestic sphere” (Raventós 2007: 8). 
Here I have presented five different definitions of basic income. What they all have in 
common is their claim that no conditions must be placed on its recipients. The universal and 
unconditional aspect of basic income is important, and may be the most controversial. Some 
proponents have argued that some conditionality can be placed on the recipient. Usually the 
suggested conditions are that the recipients should at least engage in some form of societally 
useful participation, like Atkinson’s “Participation income” (Atkinson 1996). Guy Standing 
suggests that if there must be conditions attached to basic income, to help legitimize it, it 
should be an obligation to participate in socio-political life. If conditions are attached 
however, it does not fit the ideal of a basic income. Therefore, conditions should only be 
attached temporarily to make the scheme more acceptable, and improve its chances of 
implementation (Standing 2009: 322).  
3.1.2 Similar proposals 
Basic income has been around in academic and political discussion for many years, under 
many different names, and different proposals. Other terms that are often used instead of, or 
confused with, basic income can be: universal basic income (UBI), guaranteed income, 
minimum income, demo grant, basic income guarantee, participation income, negative 
income tax, social dividend, citizen’s income, territorial dividend, citizens wage. Many 
different concepts and proposals can mean the same thing. Nevertheless, some of these 
proposals are something different from a basic income. Many of these concepts are forms of 
minimum income support, or a minimum income guarantee.  
For example a negative income tax (NIT), which is a popular alternative, is a proposal often 
associated with Milton Friedman and his book “Capitalism and Freedom” from 1962 
(Friedman 1962). This is a system where anyone who earns less than a politically defined 
minimum receives a tax refund, and anyone who earns more than the set amount pays taxes. 
The NIT proposal is different from the basic income proposal in the way that the NIT is paid 
16 
 
ex post, while basic income is paid ex ante. However, they are also similar, and they would 
have the same redistributive effect after all transfers are complete. The NIT has the advantage 
that one does not pay taxes and receive a basic income simultaneously. Basic income has the 
advantage that it provides a permanent economic security to everyone, and thereby secures 
intra-household distribution. It also deals better with the “unemployment trap”, which will be 
discussed in section 3.4.5 (Van Parijs 2004a: 15, Groot 2004). 
Basic income is also different from the stakeholder grant advocated by Thomas Paine in 1795, 
and much later by Bruce Ackerman and Anna Alstott (1999). This is a one-time grant given to 
each person at the age of 18 or 21 (Ackerman & Alstott 1999). The advantage of stakeholders 
grants over basic income is that the grant is given in as a one-time payment, giving the 
recipients full freedom to spend the money how they want. The advantage of basic income 
over the stakeholder grant is that the basic income is paid regularly, so the recipients cannot 
“blow their stake” in a short period of time. At the same time basic income increases 
autonomy, because every person has a secured regular income (Fitzpatrick 2011).  
Basic income also differs from a guaranteed minimum income, or other minimum income 
schemes, such as social security. Although they have similar goals, and are similar in seeking 
to provide a minimum income, they are different. A guaranteed minimum income typically 
operates by “topping up” deficient wages, which assumes some level of participation in the 
labour force, and attaching eligibility criteria to it, like a means test or a willingness to work 
criteria. A basic income is simply paid to everyone, in full, regardless of other income or 
circumstances. This requires no control of the recipient’s income or status on the labour 
market. These criteria make a basic income more efficient than e.g. social security.  
Most western European countries introduced some kind of minimum-income scheme during, 
or after, World War II (Van Parijs 2001: 8). They vary from country to country, and some are 
more comprehensive and generous than others. Nevertheless, they all remain conditional. The 
eligibility conditions also vary significantly across countries, but the most common conditions 
are related to age, residence, lack of financial resources and willingness to work (Frazer & 
Marlier 2009: 10). If the recipient is able to work, he/she must be willing to accept a job, or 
undergo suitable training. The recipient must also often pass a means test, and is only eligible 
if there are grounds to believe he/she has no access to other income. The recipients household 
situation also often plays a role, it matters whether he/she lives alone, with a person who has a 
job, or with a jobless person (Van Parijs 2001: 8).  There is also a clear trend in many states to 
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make eligibility conditions more restrictive, and the groups most often identified as not being 
covered are the weakest groups, the homeless, undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers (Frazer et al. 2009: 10). 
3.2 A short history of the basic income idea: 
The idea of something resembling basic income has been around for a very long time. 
Although there is no ancient author who has been credited with making a “proto-type” basic 
income, the idea has three historical roots. The idea of a minimum income first appeared in 
the 16th century, with the humanist thinkers, such as Thomas More (1478-1535) and Joan 
Lluis Vives (1492-1540), although these connections are weak (Raventós 2007). Vives argued 
that the government should secure a subsistence minimum to its residents, not on the grounds 
of justice, but on the grounds of charity. The charity should be strongly targeted at the poor. 
The poor on their side had to be “deserving” and express a willingness to work. These 
principles and similar ways of thinking are often viewed as the beginning of the “poor laws” 
in many countries, with means tested and often conditional benefits for the poor (Basic 
Income Earth Network 2011).   
The second historical root of basic income can be traced back to Thomas Paine (1737-1809). 
Thomas Paine was an activist in both the American and French revolutions (Raventós 2007), 
and the first to suggest a payment to everyone on the grounds of justice (Van Parijs 1995: 45). 
He argued that the earth is commonly owned, and persons who cultivate land therefore must 
pay a “land-rent” to those who do not have access to their own land. This idea has developed 
into the “stakeholder society” which Ackerman & Alstott have developed further (Ackerman 
et al. 1999).  
Another prominent figure who proposed ideas that more resemble a basic income was Charles 
Fourier (1772-1837). Labelled as a “utopian socialist”, he argued that the non-universality of 
poor-relief was wrong. Fourier argued for the absence of a work-test, and that a substantial 
minimum should be secured for everyone as an unconditional entitlement, because the poor 
did not enjoy access to, and free use of, natural resources which were owned by the wealthy 
land owners (Basic Income Earth Network 2011).  
Until the beginning of the 1900’s there was no serious discussion on what we now know as a 
basic income. The third historical trajectory of basic income could have started when Bertrand 
Russell offered a strong plea for a guaranteed income in his “Proposed Roads to Freedom” 
originally published in 1918 (Russell 1919). The idea was discussed seriously in party 
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conferences in the UK in the 1920’s (Widerquist et al. 2013). The same year, a British 
engineer Dennis Milner published a pamphlet entitled “Scheme for a State Bonus” (Milner & 
Milner 2004). Here he argued for an income paid unconditionally on a weekly basis to all 
citizens of the United Kingdom. The weekly payment was supposed to be a measure to 
abolish poverty. He also argued against a work requirement on the basis that all citizens had a 
right to be secured a means of subsistence from the state. The proposal was rejected by the 
Labour Party in 1921 (Van Trier 1995). 
In 1943, Juliet Rhys Williams proposed a New Social Contract (Rhys-Williams 1943) as an 
alternative to the Beveridge report (Beveridge 1942). She argued for a weekly payment 
conditional upon a work test, but she supported tax and benefit integration, which gives her a 
role in the history of basic income. The integration of taxes and benefits caught the attention 
of Milton Friedman, who designed the NIT scheme partly under her influence (Fitzpatrick 
1999: 42).  
It was not until the 1960’s and 1970’s that basic income became a popular topic in many 
industrialized countries in Europe and the United States of America. Ideas of a guaranteed 
income were proposed by many academics, and also among Nobel Prize winners, such as 
James Meade, Jan Tinbergen, James Tobin, Gunnar Myrdal, Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman (Widerquist et al. 2013). James Tobin convinced US presidential candidate George 
McGovern to promote a form of basic income, then labelled “demogrant” in his 1972 
presidential campaign, which was also one of the main reasons he lost the campaign (Van 
Parijs 2004a: 12, Sheahen 2012). 
The contemporary idea for basic income in Europe today may have started in Denmark and 
the Netherlands in the 1970’s, where the leftist parties regarded basic income as a fair 
redistributive mechanism. In 1986, a group of academics and other basic income activists 
gathered in Belgium, and formed the Basic Income European Network (BIEN), which became 
a platform for exchange of information about basic income in Europe. This is when the term 
“basic income” became the standard term to use. Before this, English speaking people were 
used to the term “social dividend” (Miller 1986). In 2004, the network expanded and changed 
its name to Basic Income Earth Network. National affiliates have been created in many 
countries since then, in Norway the national affiliate organization was recognized by BIEN in 
2012 (BIEN Norge 2013).  
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3.2.1 Basic income in Norway 
The basic income proposal has been popular among European left-liberal parties and green 
parties, first in the Netherlands and in Denmark, but it has later spread to similar parties many 
places in Europe (Van Parijs 2001). In Norway the proposal was for many years associated 
with the Norwegian Liberal Party (Venstre), who had basic income (borgerlønn) on their party 
program for many years since it was first mentioned in the party program for 1985 (Venstre 
1984). They removed it from their party platform in 20132 (Venstre 2012). Two parties in 
Norway today have basic income on their party platforms, the Green Party (Miljøpartiet de 
Grønne) and the Red Party (Rødt). The former leader of the Labour Party (1975-81) Reiulf 
Steen has shown support for a basic income, on the grounds that the Norwegian welfare 
system was too complicated (Velle 2004). However, it has not been a popular topic in election 
campaigns and debates, as it has in other countries such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.   
Other ideas have had more success in Norway, such as the idea of a “caregiver wage”, a wage 
given to people who provide some form of care. Already in 1919 Katti Anker Møller, a 
Norwegian feminist argued for a “mother’s wage” given to all mothers, to help cover the 
expenses related to childcare. She stated that women should stop working without payment, 
and that mothers should be able to exist without the support of a man (Øyen 1981: 23). The 
value of care work is also a topic which gave the inspiration for the term “rationality of 
caring” (Wærness 1984). This idea has inspired other proposals for “caregiver wages” to 
compensate people economically for doing currently unpaid work that is useful to society, 
such as raising children and taking care of the sick, disabled and the elderly. Some 
calculations showed that it would be cheaper for the state to pay people to stay home and take 
care of those who need it, than to provide institutions to take care of all those who need care 
(Øyen 1981: 24). The Norwegian Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti (KRF)) is 
the political party in Norway who mostly support the idea of economically compensating care 
work in the home. The former Christian Democratic Party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik, who 
was Prime minister in the period 1997-2000, introduced a cash-for-care benefit (kontantstøtte) 
in 19983 for parents who chose to have full time care for their children aged between one and 
two years. The benefit has not been increased since 2005, and has therefore lost much of its 
real value (Ruud & Overn 2010, Arbeids og Velferdsetaten 2013). In May 2014, acting leader 
                                                          
2
 They also suggested to means-test the child benefit, or differentiate it so that low-income earners receive a 
higher child benefit than high income earners. 
3
 In 1999 it was also introduced for children the age of two years. This was removed again in 2012, making the 
benefit only available for children aged between one and two years of age.  
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of the Labour Party Jonas G. Støre announced that he was in favour of a caregiver wage 
(omsorgslønn) for people who take care of their elderly family members (Johnsen 2014).  
Another group of people who have had some success is artists. The state provides an “artist 
salary” (garantiinntekt for kunstnere), a guaranteed minimum income to some artists who are 
eligible. The income is given to artists to provide some income security, so they can focus 
more on creating art and thereby increasing their income on their own by selling their art. The 
income is reduced if the artist earns a certain additional income from other sources (St. meld. 
nr. 48 2002-2003). 
In 2001 the economic analysis company ECON wrote a report for the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health, on the subject of poverty reduction (ECON 2001). In this report, they 
briefly discussed three different guaranteed income schemes, 1) basic income, 2) negative 
income tax and 3) universal social insurance. The basic income proposal they studied would 
replace other benefits such as student loans, child benefit, sick benefit, unemployment 
benefits and basic pension. The negative income tax proposal would function as a minimum 
income scheme, where those who earned below this set level received a “negative tax” from 
the government. Those who earned more than this level of income would pay a positive tax. 
The universal social insurance was defined as a harmonization of social benefits. Everyone 
not on the labour market would receive a set level of income, regardless of the reason for not 
being employed (ECON 2001: 16).  
They found both benefits and objections of a basic income, and the other guaranteed 
minimum income schemes. The benefits of basic income were mainly that if a guaranteed 
minimum income was set at or above the poverty line, it would effectively bring those who 
are in poverty because of a lack of participation on the labour market out of poverty. If the 
guaranteed income was set at a level below the poverty line, it would not in itself compensate 
fully for poverty, but it could reduce the amount of people living in poverty. They also argued 
that the benefits of guaranteed income schemes are only fully applicable if the guaranteed 
income is set at or above the poverty line. If the income was below the poverty line, more 
administration would be needed to administer additional benefits for those who needed them. 
They also argued that individual payments had some benefits, but that it would be unfair to 
give benefits to members of a wealthy household. Further, the report states that this form of 
policy was less stigmatizing than policies based on individual assessment of needs, and that 
rights based benefits were better than being regarded as more or less deserving by the social 
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security system. They also argued that basic income has low administration costs and can 
contribute to a simplification of the transfer system. The employees in the welfare offices 
would be freed to focus their time and resources to supervise, help and advise the recipients, 
rather than controlling them (ECON 2001).  
The criticisms they found was that it would be unfair to give benefits to families or people 
with high incomes, and that the accuracy of basic income is very low, because it is not directly 
aimed at the poor. They argued that without a differentiated income, a basic income could 
contribute to increasing inequalities, because the weakest groups would no longer be targeted 
for receiving help. A problem with basic income according to the report is that those with a 
small income would not receive more than those with a large income. Another weakness with 
the guaranteed income models is that they reduce the incentives to work. The report states that 
for a basic income, the benefit is not reduced as other income is added, but if the basic income 
is set at a liveable level, it would reduce people’s incentives to work. This could especially be 
a problem with young people, who may not be motivated to get an education, because they 
are secured a liveable income anyway. However, they argued that negative income tax and 
universal social insurance give an even lower work incentive, because the benefit is reduced 
as other income increases (ECON 2001).  
Their conclusion was that basic income set at a high enough level to live on, has a low 
accuracy, and reduces work incentives, and was therefore not recommended as a poverty 
reduction scheme. Their recommendation was that “work for welfare” programs should be 
more prominent in poverty reduction policies. They did however state that basic income, or 
the other guaranteed income schemes could have other desirable effects, for example with 
redistribution, and that more research should be conducted on the subject (ECON 2001: 17). 
The most well-known case of debate on the guaranteed income issue may have been in 2002, 
after the Labour Party set a “justice committee” (rettferdighetsutvalget) led by Bjarne Håkon 
Hanssen (AP). The committee suggested that the government should implement a minimum 
income scheme, where a guaranteed income of 120 000 NOK should be secured for everyone. 
This amount was based on calculations from the National Institute for Consumer Research 
(SIFO), on how much income was needed to have an acceptable standard of living. This was 
to be introduced along with a big reform in the administration of the welfare state, where the 
different sections of social security, national insurance and employment services was to be 
merged into one agency (NAV- reformen). The minimum income was to be given after a 
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“contract” was signed, with conditions attached which were individually planned and agreed 
on between the agency and the recipient. Although it would not be a basic income scheme, it 
would be a guaranteed minimum income scheme. The organizational reform took place, but 
the minimum income scheme was not implemented (Ellingsen & Kraugerud 2002).   
In 2006, the Department of Labour and Social Inclusion (Arbeids- og 
inkluderingsdepartementet) held a “poverty hearing” (fattigdomshøring). The research groups 
Centre for research on poverty, minimum security and social integration (Senter for studier av 
fattigdom, minstesikring og sosial integrasjon (FAMI)) and Group for inclusive welfare 
(Gruppe for inkluderende velferd (GIV)), wrote a note to be presented at the hearing. In their 
note they argued that the introduction of a basic income could completely remove poverty in 
Norway, but that this was not an instrument the Government wanted to use, and there would 
probably not be support in the population for this either (Fløtten, Lødemel & Pedersen 2006: 
17). The same point was mentioned in a report from 2011, which states that poverty could be 
removed with the implementation of some form of guaranteed income, but this would not be a 
popular proposal in Norway, because of the strict “work-line” (arbeidslinja) in Norwegian 
social policy (Fløtten, Hansen, Grødem, Grønningsæter & Nielsen 2011: 78-81). 
3.3 Basic income: the details 
Basic income has some features which deserve to be more closely examined. A basic income 
must be universal, unconditional, and paid regularly in cash on an individual basis. There are 
some variations in different basic income proposals, which will be discussed below.  
3.3.1 A universal proposal 
The basic income proposal is universal in the sense that every citizen or resident of a political 
entity has a right to the income. The principle of universality does not always mean the same 
thing. This is in contrast with a categorical benefit, to which everyone has a right only if they 
meet the criteria. This form of categorical benefit is also sometimes labelled “universal”, 
because everyone has a right to it, if they can be placed in the category (Janson 2000). 
Examples of this type of benefit can be the Norwegian child-benefit program, which all 
families with children receive, or the old age pension, which everyone has a right to receive, if 
they meet the age requirement (Kildal & Kuhnle 2005). In the case of basic income, 
“universal” means that it is for every citizen (or resident), and it is not aimed at any specific 
group, or subject to any form of discrimination.  
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In most cases, the basic income is supposed to be paid, and therefore funded, at a national 
level. Hence, a basic income is also known as “state bonus”, “national dividend”, or as in 
Norway: “citizen wage” (borgerlønn).  It can however also be funded and paid on a regional 
or a global level. “Universal” can be interpreted as “global”, as the Global Basic Income 
Foundation does, who argue for a global basic income. The European Citizens Initiative for an 
Unconditional Basic Income proposes a basic income on an EU level, or a regional level. The 
usual meaning of universal in social policy literature, and in the basic income literature is at 
the national level (Van Parijs 2001, Widerquist et al. 2013, Groot 2004, Fitzpatrick 1999, 
Esping-Andersen 1990).  
3.3.2 Basic income for whom? 
After it is decided to what political level of “universality” one has decided to focus on, it has 
to be decided who it should be for within that political unit. It can be distributed either to all 
citizens, or to all residents. In the definitions above, van Parijs argues for all permanent 
residents, while Standing mentions all legal residents. Other definitions, like the one provided 
by BIEN above, does not define this, but simply states it should be “granted to all”. Daniel 
Raventós argues for the same criteria as is used for the universal suffrage in a country, which 
can be citizenship, or accredited residence (Raventós 2007: 10). Others have argued it is 
easier to legitimize a basic income in the public by limiting it to citizens only (Jordan 2006, 
Bay et al. 2006).  
There are basic income proposals that restrict the basic income to citizens only, because it 
would be easier to legitimize. Most advocates of basic income however, do not want this form 
of restrictive entitlement, because it could cause a deeper divide in the labour market and 
other inequalities between those who are entitled and those who are not (Van Parijs 2004b). 
Eligibility is therefore usually regarded in a broader sense, and all legal residents are covered, 
and it is not restricted to full national citizens only. The criterions for receiving the basic 
income may be restricted to a minimum length of residence, the same conditions currently 
applicable for tax purposes, voting rights, or some combination of these. A basic income is 
usually regarded to include all people who have a sufficient length of legal residence (Van 
Parijs 1995: 34). 
3.3.3 An unconditional benefit - no means test or work requirement 
When comparing the basic income idea to existing social security or welfare schemes, the 
most “radical” difference is that basic income requires no means test. A basic income should 
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be paid equally to the rich and to the poor, irrespective of their income level. Under many 
existing schemes, a minimum level of income is specified for each type of household, the 
household’s total income is assessed, and the difference between the earned income and the 
stipulated minimum is paid to each household. In this sense, the benefit is given ex post, after 
an assessment of the recipient’s total income. A basic income on the other hand, is given in 
full to everyone, regardless of his or her income, so an assessment of the recipient’s income is 
unnecessary. Any other forms of means are also irrelevant in a basic income scheme. Neither 
personal savings, the value of belongings, habitation arrangements, informal income or help 
from other sources affect the level of basic income received.   
A basic income is meant to be a right, not a contributory benefit. As the basic income is a right 
for everyone, it cannot be restricted to those who have worked enough in the past, or paid 
enough in social security contributions to be entitled to social security benefits. Basic income 
also differs from work-subsidy schemes, or in-work benefits, which are restricted to 
households where at least one of the members are in employment, such as the American 
“Earned Income Tax Credit”, or the British “Working Families Tax Credit” (Van Parijs 2004b: 
17).  
A basic income must not only be paid irrespective of past or present work performances, but 
also irrespective of the willingness to accept a job. This is a radical break with many existing 
social policy schemes, which almost always are restricted to people who are willing to accept 
a job, undergo training to become more attractive for employment, actively look for a job, or 
some other useful activity (Van Parijs 2004b: 17, Frazer et al. 2009, Hatland 1992). This is 
also true in Norway, where basic income very much collides with the “work line” 
(arbeidslinjen), which is prominent in Norwegian social policy (NOU 2011:7: 45). A basic 
income scheme will not be conditional upon any requirement, or test, but be paid as a right of 
citizenship, or permanent residency (Van Parijs 2004b, Standing 2009: 299). 
3.3.4 The same amount for everyone? 
One of the important aspects of basic income is that it is paid at a uniform level. This means 
the same amount for everyone. But different basic income proposals have variations on the 
amount paid to different groups, usually children and the elderly. The most challenging group 
is often thought to be children. Some proposals restrict the basic income to adults, but there 
can also be some differentiation of the basic income, with a lower level for children, and 
maybe a higher level for the elderly.  
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Most basic income proposals are for the adult population, although most of these proposals 
are accompanied by a child-benefit system. Other view basic income as a right from birth, and 
hence does not differentiate towards children, while other proposals give a smaller payment to 
children within the basic income scheme. The basic income or child benefit for children may 
or may not be differentiated by the number of children, or it may increase with the age of the 
child, where the full basic income is only awarded once the child reaches a certain age, 
usually 18 or 21 (Van Parijs 2004b: 10, Raventós 2007: 9).   
The same can be said for the elderly. Some see the basic income for those who have not 
reached the retirement age, where the basic income would be replaced by a universal old age 
pension, which is pitched at a higher level than the basic income. Other suggestions have the 
basic income for pensioners as well, but at a higher level than for the rest of the population. In 
any case, the basic income for the elderly can be accompanied by additional public or private 
pension schemes, savings or employment (Van Parijs 2004b: 11).  
3.3.5 To each his own: individual payments in cash 
Basic income has to be paid in cash on an individual basis, which also differs from existing 
policies in most places. A basic income must be paid in cash, rather than in kind, to prevent 
any restrictions as to its use. This means that it cannot be paid in other services such as food 
stamps or government housing. In its simplest form, basic income should be paid in cash as a 
replacement for all existing welfare benefits, and public programs, such as health services, 
education, housing assistance, and so on, to provide the recipient with the highest degree of 
autonomy.  This is often criticized because most people would want some form of insurance 
against sickness and needs some form of education and other basic services (Pateman 2004). 
In most cases, a basic income is proposed in addition to other in kind benefits such as free 
education and health services(Van Parijs 2004b: 8, Van Parijs 2001).  
It is also important that it be paid on an individual basis, and at a uniform level. It can be seen 
as especially important for women that the basic income is paid on an individual basis, and 
not to the head of the household, because it can in some cases increase the bargaining power 
of a dependant woman in a household (Alstott 2001). Many existing welfare schemes, such as 
the universal old-age pension in Norway, is reduced if the recipient is married or living with 
another person (Folketrygdloven). To take account for the fact that the cost of living per 
person is reduced with the size of the household, existing minimum income schemes grant a 
smaller income to members of a couple than to a person living alone (Van Parijs 2004b: 11). 
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Basic income will remove the need for control of habitation arrangements, and be paid at a 
uniform level to each individual in society.  
3.3.6 How much money for each? Distribution vs. redistribution 
The level of basic income differs in different proposals, however most proposals do not 
suggest a specific amount. Van Parijs argues for the highest sustainable level of basic income 
(Van Parijs 1995: 33), and this would inarguably vary from country to country. A usual 
proposal however is an amount which is sufficient to live on, or set at the poverty line 
(Fitzpatrick 1999). An income, which is not sufficient to live on, is often called a “partial” 
basic income. But as van Parijs mentions, the “basic” in basic income is only meant to convey 
a basis for which all other income is to be added, and is therefore not tied to some notion of 
“basic needs” (Van Parijs 1995: 30-31). Introducing a low level of basic income and 
eventually increase it over time has also been suggested. This is known as a “transitional basic 
income”, and it is seen as a stepping stone towards a full basic income (Fitzpatrick 1999: 36). 
Others argue that for the basic income to be effective, it has to be introduced at a level which 
can provide a “modest but decent level of life” (Pateman 2004: 92).  
A basic income can be financed through specific taxes, through general taxation, or through 
investment (Van Parijs 2004b: 10). Some specific taxes which have been suggested for 
financing a basic income are; taxes on land or natural resources (eg. Robertson 1999, Tideman 
& Vallentyne 2001, Van Parijs 1995), an expanded value-added tax or consumption tax (eg. 
Madrigal & Pérez 2008), taxes on pollution (eg. Meade 1995), or taxes on speculative 
investments or on transfer of information (Van Parijs 2004b, Soete & Kamp 1996). All of 
these specific tax proposals would cause some degree of redistribution between different 
groups. This would also be the case if a basic income was financed through regular taxation 
and other sources along with all other government expenditure. Other proposals follow the 
model of Alaska’s dividend scheme, which is funded out of part of the return on a diversified 
investment fund which the state builds up from its royalties on state owned oil supplies 
(Goldsmith 2010). A similar proposal was fronted by James Meade, who proposes a social 
dividend funded out of the return on publicly owned public assets (Meade 1993, Meade 
1995). These kinds of proposals for financing and paying a basic income would have a 
distributive effect rather than a re-distributive effect, because revenue from a publicly owned 
resource would be distributed amongst the eligible recipients, rather than taxes paid by some, 
to redistribute to others.    
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3.4 Why basic income? 
There are many reasons for why basic income is argued to be a desirable social policy. There 
are principled arguments for basic income, based on normative conceptions of freedom and 
justice. There is also a large amount of literature on each of these themes, triggering a great 
academic debate. The main attractions of basic income are that it would be more effective 
than the existing social security system at guaranteeing a minimum income for all, it would 
reflect the equal status of all, and it would eliminate or reduce poverty. It would remove he 
poverty and unemployment traps, it would enhance individual autonomy, and it would create 
a simpler system, making it easier to understand and easier to administer. These arguments 
can be seen as pragmatic arguments for promoting social justice and also efficiency, security, 
dignity, empowerment and choices (Fitzpatrick 1999: 4).  
In addition to these reasons, I would also add that there are arguments for a basic income 
attached to the dignity of the recipients and promotion of flexible labour markets. There have 
also been arguments fronted from feminist and green points of view, arguing that a basic 
income has the potential to improve equality between the sexes, and that it can change society 
away from an “economic growth” focus, towards a more sustainable society (Van Parijs 1992: 
26).  
Many of the arguments used in the basic income debate are often categorized as “egalitarian”, 
“libertarian” or “conservative” to place them in an ideological tradition (eg. Raventós 2007, 
Fitzpatrick 1999). There are supporters of basic income from all positions on the ideological 
left-right dimension, and the arguments are often presented as such. Some of the arguments 
used are clearly ideological, and other supporters of basic income will disagree with these 
arguments, although they agree on the idea of basic income. Fitzpatrick (1999) argues that on 
a theoretical level, there is wide support for the basic income idea, because there are 
arguments in favour of a basic income from different ideological perspectives. But if an 
attempt was made to create a basic income policy, no political agreement would be found, 
because a basic income proposed by the right would be very different from a basic income 
proposed by the left (Fitzpatrick 1999: 5).  
I will now provide an overview of, and a closer look at, the arguments for a basic income. The 
arguments are placed in categories to try to provide a structured presentation. Although many 
of the arguments can be placed in more than one category, and both the arguments and the 
categories may overlap, the categorical presentation is considered useful.  
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3.4.1 Freedom and justice 
The freedom debate examines if and how a basic income can affect individual liberties and 
personal freedoms that society should protect (Widerquist et al. 2013: xxi). The most cited 
work in this debate may be Van Paris’s influential real-freedom argument, where a basic 
income can provide every individual with “the real freedom to whatever one might want to 
do” (Van Parijs 1995: 23). There are also other freedom related discussions. Friedman (1962) 
discussed whether a form of basic income can free the poor from an intruding and 
paternalistic welfare state that puts them under constant supervision. Fromm (2013) discussed 
whether basic income can enhance individual’s well-being. Republican theorists have also 
embraced the basic income idea, and discuss whether a basic income can enhance the freedom 
of wives and employees by freeing them financially from any dominating powers husbands or 
employers might have over them (Pettit 2007). Another freedom-based justification for basic 
income comes from Widerquist (2011), who argues that the ownership of natural resources by 
either a state, or private owners, effectively forces the property-less to labour for those who 
control the resources. To him, a basic income would allow people to be freed from forced 
service, by having “effective control of self-ownership” (Widerquist 2011: 389). With the 
security an unconditional regular income provides, people have greater freedom to exit 
economic relationships which are not satisfactory (Fitzpatrick 2011). 
In addition to the freedom debate, there is a very closely related debate on theories of justice 
and basic income (eg. Widerquist et al. 2013, Raventós 2007). These justice-related debates 
focus on presenting basic income from different important theories of justice and examine 
justice-based arguments for basic income. The most influential justification for basic income 
is Van Parijs’s “real libertarian” justification, which is heavily based on liberal-egalitarian 
values of rights, liberty and equality (Widerquist et al. 2013: 40, Van Parijs 1995). Real-
libertarianism is an attempt to remove unacceptable inequalities produced by capitalist 
societies, without it affecting freedoms. Van Parijs (1995) argues that this is best done fairly 
with a basic income at the highest sustainable level (Pateman 2004, Van Parijs 1995: 1, De 
Wispelaere 2000).  But there are also defences of basic income based on other values and 
traditions, such as both right-, and left- libertarianism (Tideman et al. 2001, Murray 2008, 
Steiner 1992), Marxism (Van der Veen & Van Parijs 1986, Howard 2013), Liberalism 
(Zwolinski 2012), Communitarianism (Jordan 1992), Conservatism (Murray 2008), 
Republicanism (Domènech et al. 2007), and democratic theory (Pateman 2004). Some have 
used Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice” (Rawls 1971) to justify a basic income (eg. Vanderborght 
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& Van Parijs 2005: 74) , but Rawls himself has dismissed that his theory of justice admits of a 
basic income (Rawls 1988). Others have used the libertarian theory of Nozick (Nozick 1974) 
to justify a basic income (eg. Steiner 1992, Vallentyne 2012, Van Parijs 1992: 9-10). An 
interesting feature of basic income is that it can both unite people who subscribe to very 
different political theories, and divide people who subscribe to similar theories (Widerquist et 
al. 2013: 40). Much of the defences and criticism are related to whether basic income can 
justly be a right of citizenship, and whether citizens should be unconditionally entitled to 
sufficient resources to cover their needs.  
3.4.2 The feminist arguments for basic income 
There are feminist discussions on basic income, and feminists are deeply divided on the 
possible effects of basic income on gender equality (Widerquist et al. 2013: 142). The 
normative discussion on feminist issues focuses on to what degree basic income can improve 
economic independence of women, if it can improve the real freedom of women, and whether 
it can improve the overall situation for women or not (Robeyns 2000). Ann Withorn (2013)  
argues that basic income can be especially favourable to women, since it would provide 
increased autonomy by offering income security. On the other hand, Ann Orloff (2013) argues 
that feminists should not be in favour of basic income, because it might provide good reasons 
for women to stay at home instead of being employed. Carol Pateman (2004) argues that a 
basic income has the potential to reduce “freeriding” of men on women’s unpaid labour in the 
home (Pateman 2004: 99). Anne Alstott (2001) argues that basic income can help fill in the 
gaps in social programs, which leave women vulnerable. Because the link between social 
benefits and paid work are strong, social programs put women at greater risk, because they 
work more part time, spend more time on childcare, spend fewer years in the labour force and 
earn less on the labour market. She concludes that a basic income could reduce the gender 
differential in income support by establishing the same income floor for men and women 
(Alstott 2001).  
Tony Fitzpatrick argues that basic income would not be too attractive for feminists who prefer 
a “universal caregiver” approach to gender equality, which the Scandinavian countries have 
embraced (Fitzpatrick 1999: 175). The Scandinavian countries have gone for an employment-
based strategy for promoting women’s interests, which suggests that full employment is the 
means to social stability and personal fulfilment (Fitzpatrick 1999: 175). If however, job 
opportunities are lacking and unemployment is high over time, basic income may be a good 
way of improving the lives of women (Fitzpatrick 1999).  
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3.4.3 The green and post-productivist arguments for basic income 
Somewhat related to the feminist debate, is a post-productivist debate. Many of the green 
parties in Europe are sympathetic towards basic income, and see it as a step towards a more 
ecologically concerned society (Van Parijs 1992: 26). Another view of post-productivism is 
that paid work, or production, should not be a central pillar of society any more, and that full 
employment is undesirable, and if not undesirable, it is an unattainable political goal.   
Supporters of this view argue that a post-productivist social policy would value unpaid 
activities and leisure time over formal employment, and would give more opportunities for 
citizens to choose their life options outside of the conventional labour market (Widerquist et 
al. 2013: 60). Tony Fitzpatrick argues that in an ecological perspective, basic income must be 
part of a “Green policy package” (Fitzpatrick 1999: 201), consisting of four parts. The other 
three parts are land and energy taxes, working time reductions, and the expansion of informal 
exchanges in the third sector (Fitzpatrick 1999).  
The green movement often argues against productivism, or the obsessive pursuit of economic 
growth (Van Parijs 2004a). Economic growth through increasing production can lead to more 
pollution, and therefore the green movement opposes it. Redistribution through basic income 
could reduce the need to increase production and economic growth to achieve full 
employment, and further damage to the environment. Once the well-being of the neediest is 
no longer dependent on economic growth, society can focus on questions of sustainability 
(Clark & Kavanagh 1996: 403). Philippe van Parijs argues that the green case for basic 
income is not in its effects on production, growth or for an ecological economy, but for its 
option for a free-time oriented option, in living life outside of traditional employment. This 
free-time option could contribute to less materialism, and less consumption. But most 
importantly, it could give people the opportunity to live their life as they wish, even if it 
differs from the pattern the market rewards (Van Parijs 2013).  
Post-productivists often argue that society is no longer dependent upon measurable productive 
work (Widerquist et al. 2013: 260). Among others, Claus Offe (1992) argues that a basic 
income should replace the post-war political goals of full employment. The reasons for this 
include the crisis of traditional models of family, of collective actors, social security 
programs, and contributory welfare programs. He argues that the only solution to all these 
problems is some form of basic income (Offe 1992). Robert Goodin (2001) describes a post-
productivist welfare regime, which he compares to the more well-known “productivist” 
welfare regimes, like the liberal-, the corporatist-, and the social democratic welfare regimes. 
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While the productivist welfare regimes all focus on having a close connection between 
employment and welfare, the post-productivist welfare regime will try to disconnect welfare 
from work, making it possible to supply welfare to everyone without formal full time work 
(Goodin 2001b).  
3.4.4  Social justice and dissatisfaction with existing systems 
There are more risks related to personal security now than before. Traditional social relations 
such as families and workplaces have become more unstable, lifestyles have become more 
individualistic and diverse, and relationships and careers have become more unstable and 
diverse (Hacker 2006, Raventós 2007). Traditional security systems are often designed to 
presume lifelong work history and more stable family relations, and are not designed to 
handle all these new challenges. A basic income would be better than existing policies at 
giving everyone more personal security and better match individual requirements. Existing 
welfare policies are often designed to match the needs of households with at least two people, 
but households of single persons have become more normal. A basic income is by definition 
designed to give security to the individual, and is therefore better matched to secure against 
individual risks (Solberg 1995, Alstott 2001, Standing 2009).  
One argument is that a basic income scheme respects people’s privacy. Current systems often 
require control of people’s private lives, to ensure that only those who are deserving and 
needy receive benefits.  This requires great insight into the lives of the recipients, and also 
some control, monitoring and regulation of their behaviour. With a basic income, the state 
would not care whether a recipient is cohabitating with someone, whether she is married or 
not, has a job or any other form of income, or if the recipients are active in other forms of 
activity or non-paid labour. In other words, a lot of the administration concerned with these 
issues are unnecessary with a basic income, and could be removed (Fitzpatrick 1999: 52).  
Another problem with many existing systems is the “social division of welfare” (Titmuss 
1963). This idea describes the division of welfare between “state welfare” and “fiscal 
welfare”. State welfare is the benefit system, which attempts to improve well-being by 
delivering goods to people. These goods are often directed at the poor. Fiscal welfare is a 
more “hidden” part of the welfare system, which attempts to improve well-being by 
deliberately failing to derive resources from people. This distinction is important, because 
they are regarded differently. The state welfare programs, such as cash transfers, are often 
classified as expenditures. They are thereby regarded as a drain on state resources, and the 
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recipients (the poor) end up being a “burden”. On the other hand, fiscal welfare such as tax 
relief is often classified as “forgone revenue”. These “benefits” are usually regarded as 
positive, and does not usually attract as much attention. A basic income could increase the 
awareness to the fact that most people actually receive some form of welfare from the 
government (Titmuss 1963, Fitzpatrick 1999, Ervik 2000). 
Professor Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee have in their studies found that the 
correlations between GDP and employment, which have been closely correlated since 1947, 
have been “decoupled” since around year 2000 in USA. The productivity, or GDP has carried 
on rising, but the rate of private employment has not followed. New jobs are being created, 
but not enough to catch up to the unemployment rate. In addition to this, the average 
household income has also been declining, and the average American household now has a 
lower income than it did in 1997. “Wages as a share of GDP are now at an all-time low, even 
as corporate profits are at an all-time high” (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2013: 62). According to 
their research, this is because of the changing nature of technological progress, in addition to 
other explanations, such as the effects of globalization, offshoring, and tax and policy changes 
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2013). A basic income could contribute to a more equal distribution of 
capital in society, by redistributing some of the increased profits to all members of society, so 
that everyone can benefit from the overall production growth.  
3.4.5 Administrative issues and economic control 
The administration apparatus in many welfare states and the rules guiding them have become 
very complicated, and it is not always easy for regular people to claim their rightful benefits, 
and navigate through the system. A comprehensive administration is often needed to keep the 
system functioning. A basic income could make the system simpler, requiring less 
administration. In addition, the expenses related to social policy are large and divided into 
many different policies, and it can be difficult to get an overview of the total redistributive 
effects, and of the total costs. A basic income would provide a simpler system, making it 
easier to control the total costs, and of the redistributive effects, whether the goal is to 
increase or decrease the redistributive effects of the system. (Øyen 1981: 16) 
A basic income would also decriminalize a lot of activity that is against the law within the 
existing means-tested benefit systems. For example, it is not easy to combine receiving 
benefits and receiving an income. If a recipient of a benefit receives an income, and declares 
this earning, benefits are often reduced or withdrawn. This could lead to a situation in which 
33 
 
the cost of accepting a job would be higher than not accepting the job and only receive the 
benefit.  This is known as the “unemployment trap”, and is closely related to the “poverty 
trap”. With a means test system, where the money earned by a recipient is withdrawn from the 
benefit, the recipients are forced to choose between inactivity, working- but losing most of the 
earned money because the benefit is reduced, or not declare the income-, which is illegal most 
places. Once people are stuck in the net of means-tested benefits, they have little incentive or 
opportunity to add to their incomes (Fitzpatrick 1999).  
A basic income would have an enormous effect on the take-up efficiency of benefits. Because 
it is given to all, there would be no complicated process for signing up, or knowledge needed 
to apply. Many social security systems today are complex and often difficult to grasp, which 
can create a barrier for people who need help to apply for benefits. With a targeted social 
security system, or other benefits, a situation could occur where only the resourceful receive 
the benefits, because they know that they have a right to them and how to apply for them. 
This is shown in Norwegian media, every time The Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Administration (NAV) lose a court case against resourceful recipients who know their rights 
(Heggen 2013, Nilsson 2012, Hansen 2010). In Norway, it is also likely that many people 
with little or no income do not apply for social security for different reasons. This can be 
because they do not know what rights they have, or because it is regarded as degrading and 
stigmatizing (Fløtten et al. 2006). A basic income would simplify the system, making it 
cheaper and more effective to run, and it would drastically improve take-up of benefits. The 
universal and unconditional aspects of a basic income could therefore lead to a reduction of 
the public sector, because much bureaucracy needed to control recipients and administer 
payments would be reduced (Van Parijs 1995, Raventós 2007).  
3.4.5.1 Makes work pay 
According to Barry (2005: 211), means testing creates welfare dependency. The problem 
however is not the existence of welfare benefits, but the form it takes. In traditional means 
tested schemes, the benefit is reduced as other additional income is earned. This gives a job a 
very high marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate can be as high as 100 percent. This happens 
when every unit of income earned, subtracts a unit of income from the means-tested benefit, 
thereby the total income is not increased, even when work is performed. This can lead to the 
return of the effort of working being too small, making the opportunity costs too high. This 
creates a work disincentive, because the increased income gain is not enough to compensate 
for the increased work effort and associated costs (Standing 2009: 139-140). This problem is 
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also relevant for benefit recipients in Norway, where in some cases the marginal tax rate can 
be 100 percent (Fløtten et al. 2006). This is what is known as the “unemployment trap”, or the 
“poverty trap”, or “welfare dependency” (Barry 2005: 211). With a basic income, additional 
income is not penalized by a reduction of the basic income, thus all additional income earned, 
gives a real increase in income. This gives lower opportunity costs through a better incentive 
to work and one does not have to become a criminal to increase income through labour (Barry 
2001: 65, Fitzpatrick 1999: 52). An unconditional benefit makes work pay, more than a 
means-tested benefit because all income is added to the basic income. 
A problem with means tested benefits are the high withdrawal rates on income. Because the 
benefit is reduced as income is earned, means testing can be a disincentive to report earnings. 
A lot of benefit fraud takes the form of unreported income, because it is attractive for benefit 
recipients to not report their earned income (Barry 2005: 210). This type of welfare fraud is 
also common in Norway. Welfare fraud is regarded as the worst kind of fraud, because it is 
regarded as a “double fraud”. The welfare recipients who do not report their income are both 
receiving a benefit they are not entitled to and at the same time working without paying taxes 
on their undisclosed income (Arbeids- og velferdsetaten 2014).  
A further objection to means testing is that it also often involves asset testing, which removes 
incentives for the recipients to save money. The problem is similar to the unemployment trap. 
Asset testing of the recipients discourages personal savings, because personal savings can 
make them ineligible for receiving benefits. Only an unconditional income can solve the 
problems related to the income-, and savings-incentives (Barry 2005: 211, Van Parijs 2004b).  
In addition to removing disincentives to find employment through the removal of the 
unemployment trap, a basic income could give workers a better incentive find a job. By 
giving workers an unconditional income, it increases their bargaining power in relation to 
their employers. The less intimidating the prospect of being unemployed is, the more choosy 
workers can be. This in turn will cause employers to make their jobs more attractive to attract 
workers, either with more pay, or more attractive in other ways (Barry 2005, Van Parijs 1995). 
This will give workers more bargaining power over their employers, potentially making 
workplaces better and more attractive. With a basic income, unattractive jobs would either 
have to be made more attractive by improving working conditions, or increase the pay. 
Another solution is that these jobs would be taken by machines, and thus, basic income could 
also further improve technological development (Barry 2005, Pasma 2010, Van Parijs 1995). 
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3.4.6 Poverty reduction and the dignity of the poor  
One of the most important arguments in favour of basic income is that it could have the effect 
of completely removing poverty (Sheahen 2012). Basic income also embodies the idea that 
everyone in society has a right to a minimum income, a level of which nobody can fall 
beneath. When the money is given as a right, rather than as a targeted benefit, fewer stigmas 
are attached to receiving it (Barry 2005). 
3.4.6.1 Reduced poverty and reduced inequality 
It is argued that a basic income could completely remove, or at least strongly reduce poverty 
(Van Parijs 2001: 3, Lohne 2008, Fløtten et al. 2006). This is of course dependent on the level 
of the basic income. It is obvious that if every citizen received an income which was at or 
above the stipulated level of poverty, there would be no persons categorized as “living in 
poverty” (Sheahen 2012, Van Parijs 2001, Fløtten 1999). Regardless of the level of basic 
income, it would help reduce poverty by providing a basic income to which all other income 
can be added, increasing the incentives for employment through the elimination of the poverty 
trap and possibly the bettering of low-paying jobs, making them more attractive, in addition to 
directly giving everyone additional income.  
Another aspect of income security is that it could make people more willing to take on the risk 
of starting their own business, and thus help create a more innovative society (Raventós 
2007). Since the basic income could keep them going with the basics, new business owners 
are not dependent on profit straight away, this could lead to more entrepreneurship. A basic 
income successfully creates a secure environment, so that entrepreneurs can know they have 
enough money to live on both while they are starting up, and in case the business fails (Barry 
2005: 213). Poverty is often associated with insufficient economic resources (Atkinson 2002, 
Townsend 1979), and it is harder than before to get a sufficient income from regular 
employment (Sheahen 2012, Standing 2009, Raventós 2007).  
Unemployment is often explained by imperfections in the market, so that it does not manage 
to provide a job for everyone who wants one (Van Parijs 1995: 107). One of the causes of 
these imperfections is often argued to be the rigidity of wages, for example minimum wage 
legislation, or union monopolies, causing obstacles to perfect competition. The lack of perfect 
competition can lead to a lack of jobs, which again leads to the market not clearing. The 
advantage of a basic income is that it could allow wages to fall to the market-clearing wage, 
because the basic income keeps them from having to live of their wages alone. This again 
would make people willing to accepts lower wages, because any wage would be an addition 
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to their basic income, and not a replacement for it (Fitzpatrick 1999: 84-85, Van Parijs 1995). 
The combination of a basic income, and a softening of labour market policy, could create a 
system combined from an effective capitalist system with an income floor for the poorest at 
an appropriate level. Thus creating a flexible US-style labour market, and at the same time 
preserving the focus on social security for everyone from the European countries. Some have 
called this “capitalism with a human face” (Fitzpatrick 1999: 85). The effect a basic income 
could have on the labour market is then a more effective market, but with a focus on personal 
economic security.  
A basic income can redistribute capital from the wealthy to the less wealthy. If the basic 
income is set at a high level, and financed through progressive taxation, it can have a massive 
redistributive effect, and allow for some people to live without having to accept a job (Øyen 
1981). International comparisons show that the occurrence of low income and income 
inequalities are lower in countries with universal welfare coverage than countries which only 
have means tested social security, and countries with universal programs have more 
redistribution than countries that have means-tested programs (St. meld. nr. 50 1998-1999). 
There are also arguments for basic income on the opposite effect, and could help create a 
more flexible labour market, by allowing workers to work for a lower wage, because the basic 
income covers their necessities (Fitzpatrick 1999: 85).  
3.4.6.2 The dignity of the poor 
An unconditional basic income could also remove stigmatization which is often associated 
with receiving benefits from the state (eg. Standing 2009, Barry 2005). In many societies, it is 
regarded as a sign of weakness to ask for help. Applicants are often perceived to be lazy, or 
not able to fulfil social requirements and fend for themselves. They can also risk being 
perceived as parasites who do not wish to contribute to society, or as failures, for having to 
apply for a program for the poor and the needy. There is however, nothing stigmatizing or 
humiliating about receiving a benefit given to all as a right of citizenship, like a basic income 
would be (Standing 2009, Raventós 2007, Van Parijs 2004b).  
From the standpoint of those who really need social assistance, this is an advantage in itself, 
because the basic income would be less stigmatizing. The problem with benefits directed at 
the poor, is that some people who actually need help, do not apply because of the stigma 
attached to it (Van Parijs 2004b). This has also been the case in Norway, that the feeling of 
shame is attached to being poor and receiving benefits (Nøra 2011). A study performed in 
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2013 found that only 13 percent of young benefit recipients are open about receiving benefits, 
and one of the reasons mentioned was that they were ashamed of receiving benefits (NTB 
2013). 
3.4.7 Compensation for lack of income 
The labour market is the central redistributive arena and source of income in our society, but 
some argue that the market is not sufficient in supplying everyone with what they need (Øyen 
1981: 16). Large groups of people do not have access to the labour market, because of 
disabilities, lack of skills, lack of jobs, or any other reason. This can be seen as a fault with the 
person, or a fault in the way the labour market is organized. If the fault is accepted to be in the 
labour market, a basic income can be seen as compensation to those who are not able to find a 
job on the labour market, and as a safety for those who have a job. John Maynard Keynes 
predicted widespread structural unemployment “due to our discovery of means of 
economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can ﬁnd new uses for labour” 
(Keynes 1931: 3), placing the fault with the system rather than the person.  
In recent years, unemployment in western European countries has been high, and seemingly 
rising. This is specially the case for young people, who have a hard time getting a job on the 
labour market (Van Parijs 2004b, Østgårdsgjelten 2013). Traditionally, the problem of 
unemployment has been dealt with by increasing the rate of growth. Technological progress 
has made rate of production increasingly high. Nevertheless, technological progress and 
higher productivity is also eliminating many jobs, especially in the low-income section of the 
job market, this could cause a shortage of jobs for everyone who wants one (Van Parijs 
2004a).  
Collins (2013) argues that technological advancement now replaces jobs at a much faster rate 
than it creates new ones. This will lead to a crisis of capitalism once the structural 
unemployment reaches permanent levels of very high unemployment rates (Collins 2013). He 
argues that in the past capitalism has survived by creating new jobs, spreading markets 
geographically, creating meta-markets in finance, government employment and investment, 
educational credential inflation and hidden Keynesianism. This time there are no more 
“escapes”, and a big reform of the system is necessary, and will come, maybe in the mid-21st 
century (Collins 2013). The effect of computerisation on labour market outcomes is well 
documented in the literature. For example studies by Charles, Hurst & Notowidigdo (2013) 
and Jaimovich & Siu (2012) show that the current low rates of employment are caused by 
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decline in manufacturing employment and the disappearance of other routine jobs. Frey & 
Osborne (2013) conclude that 47 percent of current American jobs are under “high risk” of 
being automated, perhaps during the next two decades. The structural cause of unemployment 
makes it impossible for everyone to live from his or her own labour, and furthermore the 
opportunity to get a job is not equal for every person. Therefore, if poverty is to be alleviated, 
income has to be decoupled from employment (Van Parijs 1995, Standing 2009, Sheahen 
2012, Pasma 2010).  
Many people who are not participating on the labour market are active in unpaid labour, like 
work in the home or voluntary work or care work. A basic income can be seen as a 
compensation for labour which is not regarded as “work” (Øyen 1981). In both society at 
large and in the home, there are many things which have to be done that are useful to society, 
and which ensures that society functions the way it does. Nevertheless, many of the things 
that have to be done are not currently categorized as “work”, because it is not economically 
compensated.  
Raventós mentions that three types of work are performed every day: (1) remunerated work, 
(2) domestic work and (3) voluntary work. Remunerated work is the kind of work that is 
rewarded with a salary, or what we call “employment”. This is what is usually meant when 
talking about “work” in today’s societies. Remunerated work is also the kind of work which 
can give rewards such as pensions, unemployment benefits, and other benefits which are 
conditional upon employment (Raventós 2007, Van Parijs 1995). If remunerated work was the 
only kind of work, around 75 percent of the Norwegian working-age population would 
perform work in 2011. This is above the EU average, where the percentage would be 64 
percent4 (Eurostat 2012).  
Domestic work is the kind of work which is carried out in the home to attend ones needs, or 
the needs of others. This kind of work includes “activities such as cleaning, preparing meals, 
shopping, and looking after children and old people along with any sick members of the 
family or within the unit of cohabitation” (Raventós 2007: 87). Studies show that domestic 
work is still mainly performed by women, although in Norway domestic work is increasingly 
being performed more equally between the sexes (Slagsvold & Hansen 2012). Although no 
undisputed calculations have been done, a report from 2009 calculated that domestic work in 
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 This is the percentage of the population who were employed, in the age range 15-64 years in 2011.  
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Norway had a value equal to 24 percent of GDP5 (Reiakvam & Skoglund 2009). Regardless 
of whether domestic work is performed for the family, for a friend, or as a job, it is societally 
useful work. But it is only compensated and rewarded if it is performed under employment.   
Voluntary work is another category of work which is very useful, but not compensated. 
Voluntary work is understood as “using one’s own time in unpaid activities devoted to others 
without coming under the rubric of domestic work” (Raventós 2007: 92). Voluntary work is 
important many places for a wide range of areas. A few examples could be rehabilitation 
projects for prisoners, solidarity with the poor, other solidarity projects, and many cultural 
arrangements and organisations are dependent upon voluntary workers. In 2010 the value of 
voluntary work was stipulated to be equal to 3,9 percent of GDP in Norway (Statistisk 
sentralbyrå 2012). A basic income could stimulate volunteer work amongst those who want to 
contribute in a voluntary organization, but cannot currently find the time. Volunteer work for 
most people, cannot not be seen as an alternative to remunerated work because it is not 
rewarded with money or benefits.      
The societal rewards of domestic work and voluntary work are enormous. Society would 
function less well without unpaid home, social, community and political work. Some might 
see the paradox in the fact that when someone is paid to perform domestic work, it is regarded 
as useful to society, but when the same tasks are performed without a salary, it is not valued. A 
basic income would not completely compensate domestic work and voluntary work with a 
salary, but it would allow people to spend more time on work which is not paid (Standing 
2009, Raventós 2007).  
3.5 Experiences from USA, Canada and Namibia  
No country has yet implemented a full basic income as discussed here, but the State of Alaska 
has in fact got in place a small basic income for their residents. Studying the effects of the 
Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) could give some indications on how a larger basic 
income could affect society. Between 1968 and 1980, the US and the Canadian governments 
conducted five negative income tax experiments. The results of these experiments can shed a 
light on positive and negative effects of guaranteed income. A pilot project with basic income 
in Namibia was conducted for two years in 2008 and 2009. The experiment had great 
implications, and can also highlight positive and negative effects of basic income.  
                                                          
5
 Calculations were done for the Year 2000, and the population aged between 16-74 years.  
40 
 
3.5.1 Alaska Permandent Fund: 
The Alaska Permanent Fund Divident (PFD) fits the definition of basic income in the way that 
it is paid universally, on an individual basis, it is unconditional, uniform, and it is paid in cash 
on a regular basis. It falls short in that the amount fluctuates from year to year, and it is very 
short of a substantive amount, but it does account for about 6 percent of total household 
income (Goldsmith 2010, Goldsmith 2002). The amount for 2013 was $ 900 (Alaska 
Department of Revenue 2013). The PFD was set in to action when Alaska voted to pass a 
constitutional amendment to establish a permanent fund. The initial purpose of the fund was 
to save a share of the public revenues generated from oil resources for future generations 
(Goldsmith 2010).  
In 1982, the state decided to hand out a share of the revenues from the fund to every citizen, 
to ensure that all Alaskans would benefit from the states oil resources (Goldsmith 2010).  The 
first dividend checks were paid to all citizens with residence of over six months, and the first 
amount was 1000 dollars. Today the law states that to be eligible as a recipient, 12 months of 
residency is required and in addition, an intention to reside in Alaska in the future. Currently 
around 95 percent of the population receives the payment each year (Goldsmith 2010, Alaska 
Department of Revenue 2013)  
The dividend was initially not very popular in the legislature. Opponents argued that the 
money would be better spent on public programs, and especially investment in infrastructure. 
It was also feared that the money would be spent unwisely, or that it would cause people to 
drop out of the labour market and become economic burdens. The proponents however argued 
that if the money was to give benefits to all Alaskans, they themselves should decide what to 
spend the money on. The PFD has now become the most popular government program, and is 
considered Alaska’s “third rail”. Although the legislature has the authority to reduce the level 
of the payments, or stop the payments, no politician is willing to suggest a reduction in the 
level of the program out of fear of losing elections (Goldsmith, 2010).  
Research on the PFD has not shown much on the personal level, other than most of the money 
went to day-to-day expenses, about 10-15 percent went to large purchases, and about 30 
percent use the money for saving, or paying down on loans. On the other hand, over time, 
most of the money goes into the Alaskan economy, and increases employment, population and 
income. An estimate of the effects of increase in purchasing power as a result of the PFD, is 
41 
 
ten thousand additional jobs, 15 - 20 thousand person increase in population drawn to the state 
because of the jobs, and $1,5 billion in additional personal income (Goldsmith 2010:11).  
The social effects of the PFD have not been officially studied, so the specifics of how it 
affects people’s lives are not certain. However, the macroeconomic effects are clearer. One 
important feature is that the PFD adds stability to the economy. The dividend provides an 
independent source of income to the economy, and provides stability where other sources 
fluctuate. In some areas of Alaska, the PFD directly accounts for 10 percent of cash income, 
and thereby ensures some form of economic stability to the area.  
The fund also contributes to a levelling effect on the distribution of income. The income 
provided by the PFD is equal to everyone, and is taxable as personal income by the federal 
government. As a result it has more of an impact on the low-income group, because it 
accounts for more of their income than it does for the higher income groups. Economic theory 
suggests that, other things being equal, an unconditional income would reduce the supply of 
labour, and increase wages. In the 1984 study of the early PFD program, only one percent of 
the respondents reported that they worked less because of the PFD. The PFD is too low to live 
on in itself, but in addition to the public safety net benefits, such as social security, food 
stamps, earned income tax credit and unemployment insurance, it has helped reduce the 
official poverty rate in Alaska  (Goldsmith 2002, Goldsmith 2010: 11-12).  
3.5.2 Experiences from the Negative Income Tax experiments in the US and Canada 
Between 1968 and 1980, the US and the Canadian governments conducted five negative 
income tax experiments. Four experiments were conducted in the US, and one was conducted 
in Canada. There are some differences between a NIT scheme and a basic income scheme, but 
the end result of both should be similar, and the results from the NIT experiments can be 
useful in the basic income debate. We must bear in mind that circumstances may be very 
different now than it was in the period these experiments were conducted.  
More than 200 articles have been written on the experiments and their results, most of them 
were written in the 70’s and 80’s, but some have been written in more recent years as well 
(Levine, Watts, Hollister, Williams, O'Connor & Widerquist 2005, Greenberg, Linksz & 
Mandell 2003, O'Connor 2002, Forget 2011). Some articles reported positive results and 
found few adverse effects, while others reported negative results and found devastatingly bad 
effects (Anderson & Block 1993, Hum & Simpson 1993). Both supporters and opponents of a 
guaranteed income continue to cite the results. Although these experiments cannot amount to 
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a decisive conclusion either for or against the basic income, or how it affects the labour 
market, some lessons can be drawn from the results of these experiments.  
The four experiments conducted in the USA were the first large scale social experiments to 
use the scientific method of randomly assigning human subjects into control groups and 
treatment groups, the same way medical researchers test new drugs. Some social scientists 
have called the experiments “experiments on how to conduct experiments” (Widerquist 2005: 
51). The experiments were conducted at a time when poverty-reduction was high on the 
political agenda, and when many believed social policy change was moving in the direction of 
improving economic rights.  
The first experiment studied urban populations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, between 
1968 and 1972. A second experiment was conducted in Indiana, to determine the effects of 
guaranteed income on single parents. A third experiment was on rural populations in Iowa and 
North Carolina. The final and largest experiment was conducted in Seattle and Denver, the so 
called Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (SIME-DIME).  
The primary objective of these experiments was to test the effects of guaranteeing an income, 
or rather the side effects. Data was collected on many variables, to determine the effects on 
many different areas of society, although the effects on the labour markets were the most 
cited. Other variables were health, homeownership, birth rate, school performance, divorce 
rates, and other indicators of well-being (Widerquist 2005).   
The conclusions of the labour force parts of these studies show that a NIT could cause a work 
disincentive, but that the work disincentive would not be as drastic as many opponents would 
argue. The experiment showed no sign that any segments of the population would withdraw 
completely from the work force, and the total work reduction for the main wage earners 
would be between 0-7 percent, and about 13 percent for the family as a whole (Widerquist 
2005, Forget 2011, Levine et al. 2005).   
The primary earner typically worked a lot more than the additional earners in a family, and 
only 1/3 of the decreased working time was ascribed to the primary earners. This meant that 
the reduction in working hours of the primary earner was relatively small. Married women 
reduced their working hours more, and also took longer to re-enter the workforce after a 
break. The general results showed that the secondary earners, almost always the wife, tended 
to take part of the increased family income in the form of more time for household 
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production, particularly staying home with new-borns. Effectively, married women used their 
guaranteed income to finance longer maternity leaves (Forget 2011: 286). The largest 
reduction in work hours was accredited to additional earners, mainly consisting of adolescent 
males, because they began to enter the workforce later. The delay in taking a first job at an 
older age, could suggest that some of these young males might be spending more time in 
school (Forget 2011).  
The results of the experiments came up in policy debates two different occasions in the 
1970’s. The first time was in 1970 when Richard Nixon launched his Family Action Plan 
(FAP). The preliminary results available at this time showed a very modest labour market 
response, but its critics dismissed the findings as premature. The results of the experiments 
again came up in the late 1970’s when Jimmy Carter launched his program for Better Jobs and 
Income. Although the labour market responses were still modest, new findings from the 
SIME-DIME experiments showed that the test groups had significant increases in divorce 
rates (Hannan, Tuma & Groeneveld 1977: 100). This finding was largely to blame for the 
failure of Jimmy Carter’s welfare reform scheme, but the findings were rejected in 1990, after 
further research of the data from the experiment (Forget 2011, Cain & Wissoker 1990, Levine 
et al. 2005).  
Other results from the experiments showed that children from test families in North Carolina 
showed positive results in elementary school test scores. In New Jersey, the results showed a 
positive effect on school continuation rates. In the SIME-DIME experiments, the results 
showed positive effects on adult’s continuing education. These results are impressive, as 
academic literature shows that drop-out rates, test scores and educational decisions are 
difficult to affect with direct intervention (Levine et al. 2005, Forget 2011).  
The data from the MINCOME experiment in Dauphin, Canada, was stacked away without 
much analysis or studies after the experiment was shut down. A final report was never written. 
Evelyn Forget recently got access to the data from the experiment, and analysed the data. Her 
research was from a health-perspective, because one of the best correlates of poor health is 
poverty. She wanted to see if the poverty reduction effects of a guaranteed income would lead 
to improved health in the population (Forget 2011: 284). 
Her research results show that overall hospitalizations declined for by 8.5 percent for the 
MINCOME subjects, relative to the control groups. This was especially true for 
hospitalizations for accidents and injuries, as well as mental health diagnoses. In addition to 
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this, they found a significant increase in school continuation, from year 11 into year 12 
(Forget 2011).  
3.5.3 Namibia  
In January 2008, the Namibian Basic Income Grant Coalition started a basic income grant 
project in the Otjivero-Omitara area in Namibia. The project ran for two years, from January 
2008 to December 2009 (Haarmann, Haarmann, Jauch, Shindondola-Mote, Nattrass, Van 
Niekerk & Samson 2009). Of course, there is a big difference between Namibia and more 
developed countries, but the results could potentially be interesting also for the basic income 
debate in richer countries.  
The project involved giving every person under the age of 60 living in Otjiver-Omitara N$ 
100 each month during the project period6. 930 residents got this grant without any conditions 
attached, other than living in the area and being under the age of 60 7 . The designated 
caregiver, usually the mother, received the money for children and youth under the age of 21. 
The purpose of the project was to monitor and evaluate the effects of the basic income grant 
on individuals living in the area and on the community overall. 
The findings of the project show improvements in education, health, crime and productive 
work. The local clinic had increased its monthly revenues fivefold because more people could 
afford to visit the clinic regularly. Residents considered living beneath the “food poverty” line 
saw a reduction from 76 percent to 37 percent during the first year. The basic income grants 
lead to an increase in economic activity. The rate of those engaged in income-generating 
activities increased from 44 percent to 55 percent. The grant allowed recipients to increase 
their earned income, particularly through starting their own small businesses. The grant also 
contributed to the creation of a local market, through increasing the resident’s purchasing 
power. These findings contradict that claims that a basic income would lead to laziness and 
dependency (Haarmann et al. 2009, Frankman 2010).  
The basic income also contributed to a large reduction on child malnutrition, from 42 percent 
underweight children before the project, to 10 percent underweight children at the end of the 
project. Drop-out rates from school were very high at the beginning of the project, but by the 
end of it the drop-out rate was zero percent. After the project, the rate of parents paying school 
                                                          
6
 Namibia has a universal old age pension for those over the age of 60.  
7
 There was also a condition that the resident had to have been a resident for at least six months.  
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fees more than doubled, and ended at 90 percent. Most of the children also had school 
uniforms, which they did not have before the project (Haarmann et al. 2009).  
The basic income also contributed to the reduction of household debt, suggesting the 
recipients used the grants to pay down on loans. Personal savings also increased. The average 
household income increased by 29 percent, even excluding the basic income. In addition, 
during the test period they saw a significant reduction in the crime rate. Overall, crime rates 
reported by the police fell by 42 percent. The results also show that the basic income 
contributed towards reducing the dependency of women on men for their survival, and to 
some extent freed them from the pressure to engage in transactional sex. The conclusion of 
the pilot project was that giving money to the poor is likely to contribute towards positive 
effects, which affect the lives of individuals, households, communities. This could also lead to 
positive changes on the national level (Haarmann et al. 2009: 15-16, Frankman 2010: 528).  
3.6 Objections to basic income 
There are not only supporters of basic income; there are also many objections to the idea. I 
will focus on the objections that have gained the most attention in the literature. These are the 
reciprocity and exploitation objections, the “impossibility theorem”, the migration objection, 
as well as some economic objections.  
3.6.1 Reciprocity and exploitation 
Some opponents see basic income as a threat to social justice. The main justice based 
objection to basic income comes under many names; reciprocity (White 1997, Levine 1995, 
Elster 1986), exploitation (White 1997, Barry 2001), parasitism (Van Donselaar 2013), free-
riding (Van Parijs 1995), or the Malibu surfer problem (Van Parijs 1991).   
Basic income is an unconditional payment, usually proposed at a level high enough to live on. 
This creates the possibility for people to stop working and live off the basic income only, and 
spend all their time on leisure activities (Widerquist et al. 2013: 80). Some opponents of basic 
income argue that every person who receives a payment from society owes a reciprocal 
obligation to contribute back to the society that gave it to them. Presumably, someone had to 
work to generate the payment, and therefore the person who does not contribute to society 
while receiving a payment, exploits the people who do contribute. The reciprocity objection 
refers to the act of receiving a payment without giving a reciprocal contribution back, while 
the exploitation objection refers to the allowing of “the exploitation of the industrious by the 
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lazy” (Elster 1986: 719). The two objections are not identical, but they are closely related and 
are often discussed together.  
White (1997) objects to the unconditionality of basic income. He does not object to the right 
to en equal share of external wealth, but argues that access to external wealth should be 
dependent upon a productive contribution to the community that produces the wealth. If a 
person receives a payment from society, and is able to work, he is obligated to contribute, to 
avoid exploitation of those who do contribute. A basic income would allow individuals to free 
ride on the efforts of others, and thus exploit the contributors, while redistribution conditional 
on work effort would not (White 1997). Van Donselaar (2013) makes a strong exploitation 
based objection to basic income. He criticises Van Parijs (1991) justification for basic income, 
and especially his Crazy-Lazy challenge (Van Parijs 1991: 105-108), where he argues for job 
assets and land as shared resources. Van Donselaar argues that people who sell access to 
resources in which they have no interest, such as job assets or land resources, benefit 
parasitically from this transaction (Van Donselaar 2013).  
3.6.2 Economics 
Another popular objection to basic income is related to economics. Although an easy 
objection to make could be “it will be too expensive”, this objection is not often raised in the 
scholarly literature on its own. More popular is the “impossibility theorem” (Groot 2004: 
116), or what Fitzpatrick (1999) calls the “cost-ineffectiveness objection”. This objection 
materializes the belief that basic income is utopian. Even if one agrees with some of the 
favourable aspects of basic income, many are still opposed to its implementation because of 
the belief that a basic income must either be too high to be economically feasible, or too low 
to be socially acceptable (Groot 2004).  
A common argument against basic income is that if the basic income was at the level of 
current social minimum level, the reduction of labour supply would be so great that it would 
cause a reduction in GDP, this is also known as the incentive-effect (insentiveffekten) (Fløtten 
et al. 2011: 79). The total tax revenue needed to finance the basic income would be too high, 
maybe even a flat tax rate of over 50 percent (Groot 2004: 116). This situation could cause an 
even greater reduction in labour supply, and the tax rate would have to be raised even more to 
fund the basic income. This is not sustainable, and to avoid this, the basic income must be set 
at a level that does not reduce GDP. Taken this into account, opponents argue that the level of 
basic income would have be too low to be socially acceptable as a social minimum (Groot 
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2004: 117). Another aspect is that a basic income could fortify existing social divisions. If the 
basic income can provide for an acceptable living, young people and others with a “low work 
ethic” could chose to opt out of socially productive work. This could cause a permanent social 
divide between those who participate in the formal employment market and those who are 
reliant on their basic income alone (Fitzpatrick 1999: 66).  
Underlying both the reciprocity and exploitation objection is the belief that it is wrong to give 
money to those who do not deserve it, or without receiving anything in return. Underlying in 
the impossibility theorem is the belief that a basic income would drastically reduce the 
incentive to work, either by providing a basic income at a level which can provide for a 
comfortable living without working, or by increasing the tax rate to a very high level (Clark et 
al. 1996). Another popular objection is that it is wrong to pay people who do not need it 
(Block 2001). 
3.6.3 Migration 
The migration objection is the belief that a basic income could potentially become a pull-
factor on immigrants. This in itself could cause the basic income to be unsustainable at a 
socially acceptable level. This could at the same time cause high-income earners to migrate 
from the country, because of the increased tax rates which would be needed. Howard (2004) 
argues that basic income could pose a moral dilemma for migration policy. Either a country 
may have to restrict its immigration policy, or restrict the basic income. Some argue that 
economic reasons for migrating are already strong, so a basic income would not increase 
immigration more (Boso & Vancea 2012), or that basic income would not increase the pull 
factor even more (Pioch 2002). Howard (2004) and Barry (1996) argue that open borders 
cannot be supported, and that a restrictive immigration policy must accompany a basic 
income. Bay et al. (2006) find in their study that negative attitudes towards immigration can 
significantly reduce the level of support for a basic income proposal in the Norwegian 
population.  
3.6.4 Other objections 
In addition to the objections mentioned above, I will mention a couple of other criticisms of 
basic income. There is a feminist objection, which I have discussed above. Another objection 
is to the argument that basic income promotes flexible labour markets. The objection is that 
the basic income could function as a subsidy of employers, allowing them to lower wages, 
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and in the long run adopt a low pay-low productivity employment policy instead of a high 
pay-high productivity employment policy (Clark et al. 1996: 402).   
Another objection is that basic income is politically impossible (Fitzpatrick 1999: 69). There 
is no natural political coalition to which basic income can appeal. It does have appealing 
aspects and supporters from all over the political spectrum, but this ideological diversity also 
forms a great practical challenge to its success (Fitzpatrick 1999). Fitzpatrick also argues that 
it would be hard to convince voters of supporting basic income, even if you could justify it in 
abstract terms, because “common sense says that a something-for-nothing income is wrong 
and common sense is not overturned by  the conclusions of a philosophical debate” 
(Fitzpatrick 1999: 69). Another argument from the opponents of the pilot project in Namibia, 
is that “poor people are not capable of spending their money wisely” (Haarmann et al. 2009: 
39) 
3.7 Summary 
Basic income has long historical roots, but has just recently been brought up and gained 
political and societal popularity. The high and long lasting unemployment in Europe has 
placed basic income in the public debate. The academic literature has become vast and many 
different justifications for basic income have been fronted. There are both many normative 
reasons for a basic income, as well as many practical arguments. Many of the benefits of a 
basic income are related to the universal aspect of it. But there are also many important 
objections to a basic income; one of the main objections is also related to the universal aspect 
of basic income. Securing an income to all citizens or residents in the form of a basic income 
is radical, and it has both many benefits but also possibly some devastatingly negative effects.   
Although no country currently has implemented a real basic income as discussed here, there 
have been some experiments with similar proposals. The income maintenance experiments 
from USA and Canada provide mixed results, but some surprising findings. The experiments 
conducted in Namibia have shown profound effects of providing a small guaranteed income 
for a population. The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend has become one of the most popular 
schemes in Alaska. Although the payment is small, studies on the program shows some 
positive effects from providing a unconditional income to every citizen of the state.   
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4. Child benefit 
4.1 Introduction 
The first universal benefit in the Norwegian welfare state was the child benefit, which was 
introduced in 1946 by a unanimous parliament shortly after the second world war ended 
(Pettersen 1987: 97). This is a special case because it was not only the first universal benefit; 
it was also the first benefit to be universal from the beginning, without first being introduced 
as a means-tested benefit. All families with at least two children under the age of 16 received 
the benefit, without a means test or other conditions attached. Single providers received the 
benefit from the first child, to compensate for their added needs.  
The child benefit is a cash benefit with the purpose of compensating families for additional 
costs related to raising children. Parliament sets the level of the benefit, and the state finances 
the benefit. Today the scheme is regulated in law on child benefits of 2002 8 
(Barnetrygdloven). The benefit is now given to all children living in Norway, under the age of 
18. According to EEA-regulations, children of parents working in Norway also receive the 
benefit, even though they live in another country. The benefit is usually paid to the children’s 
mother, it is not subject to a means test and it is not taxable (Barnetrygdloven).  
The child benefit discussion was already active in the 1930’s, but it was not passed into law 
until after the war, in 1946. The introduction of the universal child benefit did not only 
introduce a new social benefit, and economic support for families, but it also introduced a new 
principle in Norwegian social policy. For the first time a social program was passed with a 
universal reach, and no means test. It was to be given to all families, regardless of income, 
profession, status or living conditions.  
This chapter will provide a historical overview and analysis of the child benefit, the process of 
coming to an agreement as to its introduction, and the arguments used to argue for it. It was 
passed unanimously without discussion, but the process leading up to the vote in 1946 was 
not as smooth.  
4.2 History of the child benefit program 
The need to lighten the burden of having children was an important political topic in many 
countries in the years between the two world wars, because of rising prices, unemployment, 
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 The law was revised in 2002, and it replaced the original law of 1946.  
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insufficient housing and other problems. Some countries introduced additional wages for 
employees with families, and others introduced cash benefits of different sorts.  
In Norway, Johan Mowinckel’s liberal (Venstre) government set a “child benefit committee” 
(Barnetrygdkomiteen) in 1934 to find a solution to lightening the economic burdens for 
families with children. The committee finished their investigation by 1937 and concluded that 
the market rewarded position and effort, and did not take the workers needs for family 
provisions into account (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938). Their findings showed that the economic 
burden for the families grew with the number of children. Income per family member 
lessened with each child. The families adapted to this by lessening their nutritional standards, 
and families were forced to stay in small, overcrowded apartments. The committee was afraid 
this would have negative consequences for fertility rates, and the health of the children. The 
task at hand was to find a solution to the problem of a rising burden related to having children. 
The answer, according to a majority of the committee, was a cash transfer to families with 
children, a child benefit (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946).  
The recommendation from the Child benefit Committee was largely based on an assessment 
of development of society, and the effects of industrialization. The effects of industrialization 
especially seemed to have had a harsh effect on the economic situation of working families 
(Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938). There was wide agreement in the committee that the 
environment in which children grew up, especially the family and in the home, were 
important for the development of children. Also, the situation of workers homes and families 
had been worsened through the process of industrialization. The situation of workers with 
families had worsened in relation to their unmarried peers, because a married man and an 
unmarried man earned the same wage. The wage was sufficient for a single man, but it was 
not sufficient to provide for a whole family. The Child benefit Committee also assessed the 
implementation of labour laws, which had reduced the opportunity for child and woman 
labour. The labour laws were implemented with strong opposition from both employers and 
families. This shows that the wage labour and income of children and women was important 
for the economic situation of families. In this regard, a child benefit could help better the 
situation the laws had created for these families (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 13).  
In this period there was a high level of unemployment and lack of work for many people, 
which naturally worsened a family’s income opportunities. At the same time, expenses had 
been rising fast. One reason for this was the new “life philosophy”, with requirements of “full 
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and free expression” (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 13 (my translation)) of ones gifts and talents, 
which required more of economic resources than before. Another reason was that the 
education and training of children had become more expensive. In the pre-industrial society, 
children could often join their parents and learn from their work, and at a young age they 
could start work in a profession themselves. After industrialization the requirements for 
training and education were much higher, especially in the cities. At the same time, the need 
for purchasing power was more important than before. Clothes and food had to be purchased 
from others; even on large farms one could no longer be entirely self-sufficient. For families 
now living in the city areas, every new child became an economic burden for the family. 
Families could not afford a larger place to live as the family expanded, and living expenses 
were cut by lowering the quality of food and other household products, and the clothes budget 
was kept at a minimum. The committee also addressed the issue that the reductions in living 
standards could generally worsen people’s health and could cause an increase in mortality 
rates (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938).  
Some members of the committee, notably Johannes Bøe (AP), Sigrid Stray (V) and Jakob Vik 
(B) suggested that reduced living standards had an effect on birth rates. Studies showed that 
economic conditions were partially responsible for the drop in birth rates. They argued that a 
large fall in the population was not in the nation’s best interest, and that a child benefit could 
reduce the economic burdens of raising children, and thereby stimulate birth rates and 
population growth (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 7).  
The committee found that for each additional child a family has, the living standard of the 
family was reduced. To help families with children, a child benefit program should be put in 
place. This led to a discussion of whether the program should provide in-kind benefits or in-
cash benefits (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 34). The Child benefit Committee proposed a cash 
transfer to every child, with no exceptions, even with regards to family income. The proposal 
meant a transfer from people without children to provide for to people who did have a 
responsibility for children. This meant a horizontal redistribution rather than a vertical 
redistribution. The committee argued that the child benefit was back-payment of taxes, and 
seriously discussed if the tax payers with the highest wages should receive higher benefits 
than those with less income, because they paid more in tax. But they decided against this, 
since the benefit would be too small to effectively make a difference for this group anyway 
(Hatland 1992, NOU 1996:13 , Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946).  
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4.2.1 War-time introduction 
The first policy proposal from the peace-time government regarding the child benefit act came 
from Prime Minister Gerhardsen and his labour government in January 1946. But this was not 
the first time a child benefit was proposed in Norway. The Norwegian German-friendly party 
“National Samling” (NS) was the first political party in Norway to put a child benefit on their 
official party platform, which they did in 1934 (Quisling 1934).  
NS became the only active party in Norway during the German Occupation (1940-45), and 
they introduced a child benefit in 1945. On May 1st 1945 a child benefit was paid for some of 
the lowest wage-earners. The payment was only made once, as the Occupation ended May 8th 
1945, and nothing NS had passed during the war was accepted after the war, not even popular 
social policy (Normann 1968).  
The program implemented during the occupation was partly based on the proposition from the 
committee of 1934. Only compulsory members of the sick benefit program with less than 
9000 NOK in income were covered by the benefit, so it was not universal. The working 
population was responsible for financing the benefit. The benefit was lifted with the German 
occupation, but the Ministry of Social Affairs (Sosialdepartementet) discussed the issue in 
exile in London, and both they, and representatives from the trade union (LO) and the 
employers’ association (Arbeidsgiverforeningen) agreed that a similar benefit should also be 
provided after the war (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 1) .  
The Government decided that a similar program should be implemented, and wrote a proposal 
based on the one in place during the Occupation. The proposal was made that the benefit 
should be given to employed people with an income of less than 9000 NOK9, and tied to the 
sick benefit program. The proposal was almost identical to the one NS had implemented. This 
proposal, however, would leave out other groups, such as farmers, fishermen and other self-
employed persons. The Government had acknowledged that the children of these groups also 
could benefit from receiving the cash payment, but they decided that the inclusion of this 
group would be too costly. The defence for leaving out these groups was that the financing of 
the benefit was to be paid by an employer’s fee, and self-employed people did not have an 
employer to pay this fee. The Ministry of Social Affairs did not find it suggestible that the 
state or the municipalities should finance the benefit, so therefore this responsibility fell on 
the employers. They stated in the proposal that they would continue to work on the issue, so 
                                                          
9
 The average workers wage was about 5800 NOK, so this proposal would cover a big proportion of the working 
class, who were the main focus of the Labour Party (NOU 1996:13).  
53 
 
that the benefit program would be extended to implement farmers, fishermen and other self-
employed persons as soon as possible (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 2).  
The restriction of the benefit to those who were tied to the compulsory sick benefit was 
justified by the argument that the benefit should help those that were worst off. Most families 
needed the benefit, and by tying it to the compulsory sick benefit most workers were covered 
by it (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 1). This proposal differed from the child benefit committee’s 
proposal in the way that this proposal had a stronger focus on vertical redistribution, from 
wealthy families to worse-off families, rather than a horizontal redistribution from those 
without children to those with children.  
The government’s proposal did not sit well with the opposition, and strong objections came, 
especially from the groups who were left out of the proposal. An important objection being 
that  it was not appropriate to pass a program which was identical to the one implemented by 
the NS regime during the occupation (Sørensen 2005). Two weeks after the proposal from the 
Government, representatives from the Farmers Party (Bondepartiet) fronted an alternative 
proposal in parliament. This proposal was that all families with an income of less than 6000 
NOK should receive the child benefit (Hatland 1992: 70). This way, farmers, fishermen and 
other self-employed people would also receive the child benefit. This shows clear differences 
in the focus groups of the Labour Party and the Farmers Party, but it was also a difficult 
situation for the Labour Party. Many of their voters were from the groups of people left out of 
their proposal, and incorporated in the alternate proposal. The Labour government withdrew 
their proposal (Hatland 1992). In August the same year, the Labour government had a new 
child benefit proposal ready, and this time it did not exclude any families with children under 
the age of 16. A normative justification for including wealthy families was not given in the 
proposal, but rather practical and administrative arguments. The deciding factor was that with 
the suggested income limit for receiving the benefit, very few families would be excluded 
from it. The amount saved by not including the wealthy in the scheme would be lost in the 
administration of means-testing the families incomes (Innst. O. XII 1946).  
The new proposal for the child benefit received wide support in Parliament. In the proposition 
from the Labour Party, they stated explicitly that the child benefit should not be a tool for 
vertical redistribution, but redistribution between those with responsibilities for children and 
those without. This did not only have an administrative benefit, with regards to the means-
testing of families’ incomes as mentioned above. It also had a positive social effect for the 
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children, because with everyone included, there were no social cleavages between children 
whose parents were reliant upon the benefit, and children whose parents were not (Innst. O. 
XII 1946: 9).  
4.2.2 Introducing the principle of universalism  
The child benefit act was passed 24th October 1946, unanimously in parliament without 
discussion. Not only was a new social policy introduced, but a new principle in social policy 
was launched. The principle of universalism was introduced in the Norwegian welfare state 
(Pettersen 1987: 97). The principle is found in that there is no income limit set to be eligible 
for the benefit (Innst. O. XII 1946: 8). This may have been because of the consensus on social 
affairs agreed upon in the Joint Program after the war (Fellesprogrammet 1945), and can be 
seen as the results of cooperation and agreement among all the Norwegian parties. But as 
Hatland (1992) argues, it could also have been more of a compromise between different 
solutions than a true consensus (Hatland 1992: 70, NOU 1996:13).  
There were however, a few changes made in the bill that passed from the original proposal.  
In the original proposal, the benefit was to be set at 200 NOK per child, starting from the 
second child. The Ministry of Social Affairs who proposed the act, wanted to include the first 
child in the program also, but this would cause the program to be too expensive10 (Pettersen 
1987: 98). Parliament also wanted to include the first child, but they agreed that the cost was 
too high. They did however add to the bill that single providers should receive a child benefit 
from the first child. To ensure that the program did not exceed the budgeted amount, the level 
of the benefit was also reduced to 180 NOK (Pettersen 1987).  
The Ministry of Social Affairs stressed that the aim of the child benefit was not to cover all 
costs of having children. This was the parent’s responsibility. The aim was to lighten the 
economic burden of raising children, and prevent the standard of living from being severely 
reduced because of having children. The population growth should not be reduced by the 
economic costs of having many children. They argued that the agreed level of the benefit was 
not a very large amount, but that for families with many children the child benefit would be a 
good addition to other income. At the time it was difficult for employees to earn additional 
income, and therefore the child benefit would provide an important additional income for 
these families (Pettersen 1987).  
                                                          
10
 If the first child also were to be covered by the benefit, the cost of the program would be almost doubled, from 
ca. 78 million NOK, to about 150 million NOK.  
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The financing of the child benefit was proposed to be done through general taxation. 7/8 of 
the cost was to be covered by the state and 1/8 by the municipal governments. No extra tax 
burdens were to be placed on the tax payers, but it was to be financed through the state 
budget. All parties agreed to this method of financing the program. Financing through the 
general tax system was the most effective and the most just way for the state to distribute the 
benefit. The income received from the program was to be counted as taxable income for the 
recipients (Pettersen 1987, NOU 1996:13).   
The law also stated that the child benefit is to be paid to the mother of the child. The main 
reason for giving the payment to the mother was as recognition of the mothers work with 
raising children. It was stated in law that the mother was to receive societal recognition for the 
work she performed with the upbringing of children. For most mothers, this was the only 
income they received “on their own”. According to Pettersen (1987: 101), this could easily 
have, and maybe even should have been done also for other tasks a housewife performed.  
There were a few smaller changes in the benefit in the following years. From 1958, the 
benefit was no longer categorized as taxable income. In 1962, the benefit was made 
progressive, to increase with the number of children. In 1970 the child benefit was also 
extended to cover the first child, and in addition, the benefit was doubled for single parents 
(Hippe 1988, Pettersen 1987). In 2000, the age restriction was increased to include children 
up to the age of 18, instead of 16. In 2001, the progressive aspect was removed, and the same 
amount is given for every child (Ot. prp. nr. 57 2000-2001).  
In recent years politicians from the Liberal party (Venstre), as well as politicians from other 
parties have argued for making the child benefit means tested, and aimed at the poor 
(Wernersen 2014). The level of the child benefit has not been raised since 1996, and the 
Norwegian child benefit scheme has gone from being the most generous in the Nordic 
countries, to becoming the least generous (Wernersen 2014, NOU 2009:10). A poll from 2012 
found that 47 percent of the Norwegian population is in favour of means testing the child 
benefit and other universal benefits, while 44 percent does not want to means test universal 
benefits (Haugen 2012).  
4.3 Why a universal child benefit?  
The arguments found in the discussions leading to the passing of the child benefit act have 
been many, and some of them even controversial. A clearly stated normative or ideological 
justification for a universal child benefit was not stated, and the decision was primarily based 
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on practical arguments. In the end, the proposal from 1946 which was unanimously passed in 
parliament was closely built on the Child Benefit Committees proposal from 1937. Although 
many discussions and different proposal surfaced in the time between, the original proposal 
was passed after 11 years with only a few changes. The main argument for not making the 
benefit means tested was that a means test would not provide any financial savings, because 
what would have been saved on the payment to beneficiaries would have been lost in 
administration costs. The administration of a means test would more difficult, time consuming 
and expensive than simply giving the benefit to everyone (Innst. O. XII 1946: 9).  
Another important argument was the financing. Originally the money to pay for the benefit 
was meant to come from an employers’ fee. This caused everyone who was self-employed to 
be left out of the benefit program, even though many of these children and families were in 
the lowest income groups. When the pressure came to include everyone in the program, the 
financing model had to be changed. Financing the benefit through the state budget was agreed 
to be the most effective and just way of doing it. This would also place the biggest burden on 
those with the largest incomes, because those with higher incomes paid more in taxes than 
those with low incomes (Innst. O. XII 1946: 9).  
Furthermore, one of the most important arguments from 1946 was the assessment of the 
development of society, as mentioned above. The ability for a family to increase their wages 
was very small, and the wage of only one provider could not sufficiently cover the additional 
costs of raising children, without significantly reducing their standard of living. The 
discussion of the kind of benefits best suited to deal with these issues lead to the discussion of 
whether the benefits should be provided in-cash or in-kind.  
4.3.1 Cash benefits or public services? 
There was some discussion regarding this issue in the committee, and the supporters of in-
kind benefits argued that some needs are of fundamental value for families, like a good place 
to live, sanitary and medical measures, and free education and job training. The supporters of 
in-kind benefits argued that these needs were best met through making the means available to 
the children and families directly though collective measures from the society. They also 
argued that providing the benefits in-kind was the only way of controlling that the resources 
used would actually benefit the children, and not be misused by the children’s parents. With 
the cost of the expensive collective services they should provide, there would be no money 
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left to provide an in-cash benefit to families, which would also be very expensive (Innst. O. 
XII 1946).  
The supporters of in-cash child benefit usually argued that “…housewives know better than 
the state how to put these resources to good use, especially with regards to important needs 
such as clothes, food, shoes, light and heat” (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 34 (my 
translation)).The supporters of the in-cash child benefit acknowledged that some parents 
would waste their benefit money on for example alcohol, but that misuse would account for 
very few instances, and it could be prevented by control measures. The supporters of cash 
benefits also argued that cash benefits would elevate housewife’s self-esteem and 
independence by giving money directly to them for the work they did in the home. They also 
stated that a cash benefit would be especially welcomed if it could provide mothers with an 
opportunity to stay at home if she preferred, as most mothers did, instead of taking paid work 
outside of the household (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 35). Another argument for cash transfers 
was that it would increase the purchasing power of the public which would increase their 
standard of living.  
Another strong argument was that the state should implement a cash benefit out of self-
interest. The committee argued that it was in the state’s interest that the birth rate was 
maintained, and that new generations kept growing up to continue the work previous 
generations had started, and bring the country forward.  They also argued that it was in the 
states’ interest that the population had as good living conditions as possible, both materially 
and culturally, “because the prosperity and progress of the nation is dependent upon every 
individual’s abilities” (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 37 (my translation)). 
The last argument used in the proposition for an in-cash benefit was that it would stimulate 
population growth. The descending number of children born at the time showed that a child 
benefit from the state was needed. To have children was the result of a deeply human instinct, 
and when married people preferred to remain childless or only have one or two children, it 
was a sad expression of the difficulties the families had to struggle with. One of the means 
available to reduce the difficulties families struggle with was a child benefit in cash, which at 
least to some degree could mitigate the differences in living conditions between those who 
had children and those who did not (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 38).  
A discussion on whether the child benefit should be given as a tax relief for families with 
children rather than a cash payment also came up. But they discovered that many of the 
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poorest families did not pay much in state tax because their income was low, so a tax relief for 
these families would not be sufficient. They did argue that a tax relief for families with 
children would be a welcomed supplement to the cash payment, but not a replacement for it 
(Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 35-36). 
The majority of the committee concluded that without the cash benefit, the disparity between 
income and the burden of providing for children would not be sufficiently reduced for the 
largest, and the worst-off families. The collective measures had their indisputable value, and 
must also be extended. But this must not be done at the expense of an in-cash benefit provided 
to families with children. The majority of the committee found that the in-kind services and 
benefits must be supplemented by a cash benefit, which increased with the number of children 
(Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938). The committee also stated that there were some elementary and 
demanding needs which had to be met, which could not be solved with collective measures 
“unless one wants to change to a fully communist household” (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 34 
(my translation)), such as the need for food, drink, clothes, shoes, light, heat, utensils, 
household articles, taxes, membership fees, transportation expenses, newspapers,  pleasures 
and recreation. These expenses could not be covered by collective measures, and were best 
secured by a cash transfer to families, who themselves could distribute the cash where it was 
needed (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938).  
4.3.2 Unfair to people without children? 
The second big question that came up for discussion in the committee was the question of 
whether the child benefit was unfair to people who did not have children 
(Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 39). The first argument fronted to support the child benefit from 
this discussion was that it was probable that most people, especially young people, would 
have children in the future, even if they did not currently have children. If they saw the 
contribution they had to pay when they did not have children as unfair, they should remember 
that when they had children in the future, they would receive more in return through the 
program than they had contributed towards it. This would follow the same principle as in the 
existing sick benefit, where people who were not sick at all times “paid for” those who were 
sick, and in the unemployment benefit, where those who at any time were employed “paid 
for” those who at any time were unemployed. In the child benefit, those who did not have 
children would “pay for” those who did have children (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938).  
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The other argument was that in all countries, it was regarded as a requirement that the whole 
population or specific groups of the populations were covered by social security programs, 
even though some people would benefit from the policy, and others would not. They argued 
that any social insurance scheme should cover the whole population, even if some people 
would lose more than they would benefit from it, because those who needed it the most would 
benefit from it (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 39).  
Another related objection was that the cost would be too high for those who had to pay 
without benefitting from the scheme. Again the committee pointed to other benefits, like the 
old-age pension and the sick benefit. When they had been able to implement those programs 
for the whole population, and get past the practical and economic concerns, the same would 
happen with the child benefit (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946).  
4.3.3 For everyone or aimed at the poor? 
The last big concern that surfaced in the discussion in the committee was the question of 
whether or not the benefit should be given to families who had high incomes 
(Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 43). The main argument against giving to high income families 
was that the income from the child benefit would not make any difference. The children of 
wealthy families would be nurtured as well anyway, because they could afford it. Giving a 
child benefit to wealthy families would not improve the child’s upbringing, and would 
therefore not benefit society.  
The majority of the child benefit committee was clear on the premise that the family’s income 
should not have any implication on the right to receive a child benefit. The main argument 
used to reach this conclusion was that no matter how the program was to be financed, through 
direct or indirect taxation; those with high incomes would contribute more than those with 
lower incomes. The committee also stated that the need for economic assistance in the raising 
of children was present in all social classes. It was therefore natural that wealthy families also 
should receive some recognition for their useful task of raising children. In addition they 
pointed out that the education of children from high income families was a lot more costly 
than for lower income families (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 42).  
Another argument was made that a family had to be very high up on the income scale before 
the addition of a child benefit would not make any difference for the family. Very few families 
had such a high income. Related to this issue, there would be problems attached to setting an 
income level for which to be eligible or not for the benefit. The question whether a family was 
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above or below the set income level could be questionable, and the decisions could be 
arbitrary. The administration needed to perform these control mechanisms would have to be 
large and encompassing, making it expensive and slow, which could lead to great 
dissatisfaction in the population.   
Furthermore, a family’s income could vary from one year to the next. A family could 
interchangeably be above or below the set income level, making their total income unstable. It 
could also happen that a family earned an income just below the set income level, thereby 
qualifying for receiving the benefit. The next year however, when their income had increased 
by the amount of the benefit, their total income could be above the set income level because 
they received the benefit, and thereby not being eligible anymore (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 
44, Innst. O. XII 1946). Additionally, if the child benefit was made conditional on income 
level, it would also be reasonable to consider a condition attached to wealth or personal 
savings. This could further complicate the system and lead to more expensive and time-
consuming administration (Ot. Prp. nr. 127 1945-1946). 
Another idea that was discussed was the possibility of limiting the benefit by the number of 
children and the family’s income, so that high income families would only receive the benefit 
for child number three or four, while the lower income families would receive it from the first 
or the second child.  This was also dismissed, because of the amount of administration and 
control that would be needed to perform the tests. The child benefit committee decided that 
the probability that the total cost of the scheme would be lower by keeping the higher income 
groups out of the program was so low, that it would be cheaper to give all families the child 
benefit (Ot. Prp. nr. 127 1945-1946: 3).   
4.3.4 Dissatisfacction with the poor relief system 
Another aspect related to the means-testing of the child benefit, was strong resentment 
towards the old poor relief system. The bearing principle in the poor relief system was the 
discretionary principle, in which authorities had strong discretionary power to decide what 
kind of help a person needed. The most demeaning aspect of the poor laws was that the 
person who needed help, had to provide all information on their  private affairs, and all parts 
of his or her private life,  and submit themselves to another person’s discretion as to what kind 
of help he or she needed (Ot. Prp. nr. 127 1945-1946: 44).  
The argument was that the child benefit must not bear any resemblance to the poor laws 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1946: 562). The means-testing of family’s income could be 
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demeaning for the recipients, and those who received the benefit could be stigmatized. If the 
benefit was given to all families irrespective of income or wealth, there would be no 
stigmatization of children who received the benefit from those who did not receive the benefit 
(Innst. O. XII 1946: 9).  
Finally, the argument was made that the benefit should also be paid for other family members 
who were ill or in need of care or otherwise dependent upon the family, but this was discarded 
for economic and practical reasons, for this issue would no doubt raise new and difficult 
questions (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946: 8).  
4.4 Objections to a universal child benefit: 
Of the members in the Child Benefit Committee, there was one member who did not share the 
views of the majority. Margrete Bonnevie (V) did not agree with the rest of the committee and 
presented her own evaluation of the child benefit. The arguments she fronted in her 
proposition against the in-cash universal child benefit, represents the only arguments against 
the proposal which passed in 1946. She did not want a universal benefit in cash, but rather a 
strengthening of public institutions (Ot. prp. nr. 16 1945-1946).  
The minority recognized the need to do something to secure children better than what was in 
place at the time, but this should not be done with a cash payment to all families with 
children. There were two main arguments against the child benefit in the proposal. The first 
was that the natural act of having children should not make people eligible for benefits, and 
the second was economic concerns regarding universal cash grants.  
4.4.1 Benefits for having children? 
Many people regarded the issue to be of equal importance to old age pensions, disability 
benefits, unemployment benefits and sick benefits, and many countries had already 
implemented programs to help children. The minority proposal argued that helping families 
who could not themselves provide for their children was different than the other programs, but 
acknowledged that the issue had to be solved, and preferably in a way which was not 
associated with the poor relief system (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 56).  
The minority argued that it could not see the justification for providing a social benefit of the 
same character as the old-age pension, sick benefit, unemployment benefit or the disability 
benefit for children. Not for the worst off, and not for anyone. Because creating a social 
benefit for all children would mean that they created a benefit for human nature. Social 
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benefits should be for those who were in a situation outside the “norm”, and not for something 
which was normal, like having children (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 93). The argument was 
that principally, the states should not give cash benefits to anyone who decided to have 
children without being able to provide for them, or that benefits should be given to anyone 
without regard for individual conditions or personal needs. In this argument lie both an 
objection to the principle of universalism in social policy, and an objection to giving cash 
benefits to anyone, even a means tested cash benefit. The minority proposal argues it is 
inadvisable to introduce universal cash benefits in social policy (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 
93).  
4.4.2 Objections to cash benefits 
The minority proposal also argues strongly against any form of cash benefits on other 
grounds. One of the arguments is that society would not gain from poor people having 
children. They argued that only those who have an adequate income, or who have reasonable 
expectations of earning enough to provide for children should be encouraged to have children. 
If it was already the case that many families who had many children were not capable of 
providing for them, society should not make sacrifices to encourage them further. On the 
contrary, the minority stated that only those who were most suited to provide for a family 
should be encouraged by the government to have children. The government should not 
encourage those with low earnings to have children, by providing them with cash benefits 
(Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 93).  
A child benefit paid to everyone under a certain income, could lead to young people without 
prospects for the future irresponsibly putting children into the world. If the government 
decided to give everyone, or only those under a certain income a right to an in-cash child 
benefit, it would encourage all child production, regardless of whether it would be likely that 
the upbringing would be responsible or not. The minority of the Child Benefit Committee 
thereby concluded that it could not recommend an in-cash benefit, whether it was aimed at the 
poor or was universal  (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938).   
4.4.3 Economic concerns 
The other main objection was related to economics. The minority of the Child Benefit 
Committee argued that it would be impossible to provide cash benefits at a high enough level 
to make a real difference. They argued that other benefits covered all of the costs related to 
the “damages” they were supposed to cover, such as injuries or sickness. A cash benefit would 
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provide each family with such a small amount of money that the effect of it would be too low 
to make a difference, and it would never be able to cover all the increased costs of having 
children. Therefore, the minority recommendation was to improve collective institutions and 
state provisions for children, rather than introducing a child benefit in cash 
(Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938).  
They did state that an additional income of 100-200 NOK would be regarded as a substantial 
amount for a very low-income family. But giving even such a small amount to the worst off 
would be too costly to implement. It would be especially difficult to afford it in addition to 
other social policy measures which were already in place, and were all necessary and in need 
of improvements. Their argument was that the amount of money it would cost to pay all 
families with children in cash would be better and more efficiently spent in other ways, such 
as on housing benefits, to provide adequate and affordable housing to those who needed it, 
kindergartens and day care centres, medical facilities, and food provided in schools for the 
neediest children (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 94). 
4.4.4 A feminist objection 
Another reason for opposing the child benefit was from a feminist point of view. The minority 
proposal had a strong focus on women’s place in society. One of the reasons for 
recommending collective institutions such as day care centres, medical facilities and 
kindergartens rather than cash was that it would allow for more women to enter the 
workforce. At the time of this evaluation, married women were usually not active on the 
labour market, but spent their time in the home. The argument was that if wives who were at 
home entered the workforce, the family could increase their income and living standards this 
way instead of the government paying mothers to stay at home (Barnetrygdkomiteen 1938: 
93).  
4.5 Summary: 
There is no doubt that the child benefit has been an important issue in Norwegian social 
policy. It has been debated for many years and by many people before it even made it to a 
vote in parliament. The biggest argument against the benefit seems to have been the cost 
associated with it, and who should finance it. The Labour Party wanted it to firstly cover 
wage- earners, and be financed by employers.  
The Farmers Party wanted it to also cover the self- employed, but they had no employers to 
finance it, so it would have to be financed through a general taxation to also cover these 
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groups. Both of these parties wanted the benefit to cover those families with the lowest wages, 
those who were worst-off. The Liberal Party wanted the benefit to also cover families with 
higher wages, if it was to be financed through general taxation. Because those with the highest 
incomes would contribute more to the benefit than those with low incomes, so it would only 
be fair if they too could benefit from it. The political will to collaborate and compromise, 
spelled out in the joint programme seems to have been a success. The result of the long child 
benefit debate was the first universal benefit in Norway, the universal child benefit. Table 1 
sums up the different proposals for a child benefit from 1937 until it was passed in 1946. 
TABLE 1 Different proposals for a child benefit 
Year Who proposed it Coverage Passed / not 
passed  
Who supported it? 
1937 Recommendation from the 
Child benefit committee of 
1934 - Majority 
Recommends a 
universal benefit for 
all children.  
Never came up for 
a vote.  
Child benefit 
committee - 
members from 
different parties 
1937 Recommendation from the 
Child benefit committee of 
1934 - Minority 
Recommends to 
discard the child 
benefit proposal 
Never came up for 
a vote. 
Child benefit 
committee  - a 
member from the 
Liberal Party 
1945 Child benefit program from 
NS party platform 
Covered all 
members of the sick 
benefit with an 
income of < 9000 
NOK.  
Passed – active 
from May 1st 1945. 
Repealed May 8th 
1945 
Passed by NS 
during occupation 
1946 First proposal from Labour 
Government (AP) 
All members of 
sick benefit with 
income < 9000 
NOK.  
Not passed: Many 
objections 
Labour Party 
1946 Alternate proposal from  
opposition - Farmers party 
(B) (Nils Trædal, Einar 
Frogner, Jon Leirfall) 
Universal – Means 
tested at income < 
6000 NOK 
Not passed Farmers Party 
1946 Second proposal from 
Labour Government (AP) 
Universal – from 
second child. No 
means test. Single 
providers from 1st 
child.  
Unanimously 
passed  
All parties 
Table 1 shows the six different serious proposals made for a child benefit sine the first serious recommendation 
in 1937 until the final proposal was passed in 1946. All data collected from the sources referred to in chapter 4.  
 
There were many arguments used in favour of a universal child benefit. Although there was 
never fronted an ideological reason for making the benefit universal, there were plenty of 
other arguments of a more practical nature for doing so. These arguments were mainly 
concerned with administrative considerations, and also arguments concerning the dignity of 
the recipients. There was also raised quite a few arguments against making the child benefit 
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universal. All parties agreed on the bill when it passed in 1946, but when the preparatory work 
was done in 1937, there were many objections. Most of the opponents used the arguments that 
it would be too costly to give this benefit to everyone. Some argued against the principle of 
giving cash benefits to people as a right, but also some feminist concerns were brought up 
against the universal child benefit.  
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5. Old age pension 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will find the arguments surrounding the introduction of the Norwegian old age 
pension, and why it was made universal in 1957. I will provide a historical overview of the 
origins of the old age pension scheme in Norway, from the introduction of the first pension 
scheme in 1936, to the introduction of the two-tier system introduced in 1967. The main focus 
however, will be on the transformation from a means tested scheme to a universal scheme 
which came in 1957. These milestones in social policy are important for the understanding of 
the Norwegian welfare state, and the principles which guide it. The development of the old 
age pension may be the best example of the development of the Norwegian welfare state, 
because other policies have followed the principles in the old age pension.  
Social benefits to support those who are too old to support themselves are a main theme for 
many welfare states. Traditionally, old age has been a difficult part of life for many and the 
risk of poverty has often been very high amongst the elderly. Because of old age pensions, 
elderly people in many countries are no longer reliant upon the income and support of their 
children or other family to be financially secure. The elderly in Norway are now no more 
likely than other citizens of being poor. At the same time income inequalities between 
pensioners are smaller than income inequality in the rest of the population (Hatland 
2001:106). This is because an old age pension is given unconditionally to all citizens over the 
age of 67. Other parts of society do not have this minimum income guarantee, which the old 
age pension ensures. The battles for the old age pension in Norway have been important for 
the development of the welfare state, because agreement as to how benefits are to be 
distributed, financed, and organized have been most prominent with regards to the old age 
pensions. The decisions made with regards to old age pensions, have also influenced other 
social policy schemes in Norway (Hatland 2001).  
5.2 Historical overview 
The old-age pension in Norway has been introduced in three main steps. The first version of 
the old age pension was passed by parliament in 1923, but it was not introduced until 1936, 
because it was considered too expensive to introduce at the time (Kuhnle & Solheim 1991). In 
the years between, there was much debate as to what form the pension should take, and how it 
should be administered. The debate was especially focused on how the pension should be 
financed. One solution was an insurance based scheme, where what was paid during active 
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working years was in proportion to the amount received in pensions. If no amount was 
contributed, no pension would be paid. The alternative was a tax-based scheme, which was 
the favoured option in 1923, in which a means-test should decide if a recipient was eligible 
for a pension or not. In the end, it was decided on a universal, but strictly means tested 
minimum-support benefit (Kuhnle et al. 1991).  
A new old age pension scheme was introduced in 1957. This time they removed the means 
test, so all persons over the age of 70 were secured a flat-rate pension from the state, 
regardless of other income, previous income or personal savings. In other words, the old age 
pension was made universal and unconditional.  The next development in the old age pension 
scheme came in 1966, with the act on supplementary and income-related old age pension 
scheme which was implemented in 1967. The new pension scheme consisted of two parts: a 
universal and unconditional basic pension and an income related part calculated from the 
basis of earnings and years in employment (Pettersen 1987, Kuhnle 2001, Hatland 2001, 
Hippe 1988). 
The old age pension system in Norway today is in many ways similar to the reformed scheme 
of 1967. The aim of the old age pension system is to prevent poverty, maintain a standard of 
living into old age for those who have been employed, and to reduce income inequalities 
among the elderly (Halvorsen & Stjernø 2008: 76). All residents of Norway and people 
working or living in Norway, over the age of 67, are covered by the National old age pension 
scheme. The full basic pension (grunnbeløp) is conditional upon 40 years membership in the 
National Insurance Scheme (Folketrygden), where residence or employment in the country 
constitutes compulsory membership. Everyone has the right to a minimum pension 
unconditionally. In addition, an income related pension is added to the basic pension 
calculated from the basis of earnings and years in employment, up to a certain point.  The 
pension is regulated in the law on national insurance (Folketrygdloven) of 1997, which 
replaced the original law of 1966 (Folketrygdloven , Halvorsen et al. 2008).  
5.3 Introducing a means tested old age pension: 
The first state-organized old age pension was introduced in Norway in 1936, but the idea had 
been around since the 1840’s, and had been discussed several times in the period between 
these years. The first serious attempt to introduce a pension scheme came in 1894, when the 
first parliamentary commission was set to make a plan for an old age pension scheme. A bill 
was proposed in 1899, and again in 1902, but none of these proposals were passed into law. A 
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new committee (folkeforsikringskomiteen), led by Oscar Jæger (V) was set in 1907, but 
internal differences with regards to the insurance principles made it impossible for them to 
agree on one solution to recommend (Kuhnle et al. 1991).  
While parliament could not agree to a solution for the old age pension, the first municipal old 
age pension was introduced 1916, “for persons over the age of 65 who is unable to provide for 
themselves” (Hippe 1988: 14 (my translation)). This was adapted to other municipalities’ as 
well, but never covered the whole country. The benefit was means tested and the level was set 
at the local authorities’ discretion. By 1922 this benefit covered 105 municipalities, around 40 
per cent of the population (Hatland et al. 2011: 110). These systems had some success, and 
this type of means tested, municipally administered old age pension later won through in 
parliament (Hatland et al. 2011).   
In 1918 the government proposed an insurance scheme for disability and old age, which led to 
another committee being appointed in 1919 (Kuhnle 1991: 46). A proposal was put forth in 
1920, which recommended a municipally administered pension supported by the state. This 
recommendation was discarded, and instead a new proposal was made in 1922, based on a 
progressive tax system (Kuhnle 1991). This proposal passed in 1923 with the Labour Party 
(Arbeiderpartiet (AP)) and the Conservative Party (Høyre (H)) in majority in parliament, but 
it was never implemented, for financial reasons (Kuhnle 1991). The benefit was too generous 
for the taxes to cover it (Hippe 1988). 
In 1935 a new committee was set by the Johan Nygaardsvold (AP) Labour Government to 
review all social policy. One of the proposals made by the committee was a new old age 
pension scheme, based on a fee of 1 % on all personal income and company income (Kuhnle 
1991: 46-47). The law was passed in 1936, and the first state-wide old age pension scheme 
was introduced. Although the law covered the whole population, the pension was modest and 
eligibility was limited by a strict means test. Many of those who paid the insurance fee ended 
up not receiving a pension. The means test was strict, and was affected by other income, 
savings, private insurance schemes, gifts and other assets. Only the old who had no other way 
of supporting themselves would receive the pension. The pension was also differentiated with 
regards to whether the recipient lived in rural or central areas. People under employment or 
otherwise active on the labour market would finance the pension. This meant that current state 
revenues would pay for the current pensions, this is known as the “pay-as-you-go” system 
(Halvorsen et al. 2008, Seip 1981, Hatland 1992, Kuhnle 1991).  
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The motivation for the old age pension system was that the Labour Government wanted a 
pension system based on economic redistribution. The redistributive effect was achieved 
partly through progressive taxation of income and wealth, and an additional fee to finance the 
pension system. Economic redistribution was also achieved through means testing the 
pension. Only the poorest wage earners were eligible recipients (Pettersen 1987, Kuhnle et al. 
1991).  
The politicians had no problems understanding that high unemployment rates and low wages 
made it difficult for people to save up for their own old age, and saw the need for an old age 
pension. Not everyone however saw the economic redistributive effect that was inherent in 
the old age pension as an ideal solution. Especially the “non-socialist” political parties wanted 
to remove the means test. However, the means tested pension was introduced at a time where 
there was not enough money to finance a universal pension. As long as a universal pension 
could not be financed, a pension for the worst-off was a priority. Many politicians, especially 
from the Liberal Party (V) and the Farmers Party (B) regarded the first pension scheme as a 
beginning, which could gradually be extended to cover more and more groups of people.  
In the years prior to World War II, the Norwegian Parliament regularly debated how the old 
age pension best could be administered. The three main issues they discussed were: should it 
be a public or private scheme, should it be financed through the principle of pay-as-you-go or 
should it be funded in other ways, and should it provide basic security or income maintenance 
(Halvorsen et al. 2008, Pettersen 1987, Hatland et al. 2011)? 
5.3.1 Sources of disagreement in the old age pension 
After World War II, there was a shift in the political climate, including the debates on social 
policy. There was now broad support amongst the Norwegian political parties for the state to 
have an active role in providing welfare for the population. Most of the parties had agreed to 
this before the war, but they were more willing to compromise after the war (Pettersen 1987). 
With passing the Child Benefit act in 1946, parliament had introduced the principle of 
universalism into Norwegian social policy. The question arose whether this principle should 
also be introduced to other social policy areas. The debate was mainly focused on what to 
prioritize first in social policy. All of the four largest political parties agreed that social policy 
should be extended to cover new and larger groups of the population, but they disagreed on 
what should be extended first (Fellesprogrammet 1945: 29, Pettersen 1987). The 
disagreements between the parties were mainly focused on how to extend the benefits, and 
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especially the old age pension. Should the old age pension be extended to become 
unconditional and universal, and cover all people who had reached a certain age, or should it 
be extended by increasing the size of the pension, to improve the standard of living for those 
who were already receiving the pension? The implications of making the old age pension 
universal could potentially be large, because the old age pension set the standard for 
principles of distribution and criteria for social policy. If the old age pension was made 
universal, other policies would follow suit (Pettersen 1987). 
The second big issue between the political parties in parliament after the war was regarding 
the redistributive effects of the pension. The pension scheme from 1936 had the goal of 
providing a pension of such a size that 60% of the pension should cover the cost of a 
substantive minimum for one person (Pettersen 1987: 29). Politicians from the “socialist 
block” argued that this goal could not be met if the means testing of the pension was removed, 
because the cost of extending the coverage would be too large to at the same time increase the 
size of the pension to reach the target level (Pettersen 1987).  
A third big question in the “priority conflict” after the war was whether the resources 
available for social policies should be used to improve the existing social policies, or if they 
should be distributed to other needy groups. The other groups in question were the disabled, 
widows and single mothers. The existing social policy schemes were largely based on a model 
of male breadwinner families, so the loss of a husband was a real danger for the rest of the 
family (Andresen 2007).  
Other issues were also the topic of discussion between the political parties, like the mode of 
financing. The financing system for the old age pension from 1936 was based on progressive 
taxation. Those with the highest incomes contributed the most, but did not receive a pension 
in return. This principle was the root of this discussion. The non-socialist parties, mainly the 
Liberal Party (V) and the Farmers Party (B) argued that there should be more of a coupling 
between how much one contributed and how much one received in return. Or at least some 
degree of differentiation should be made, based on the amount contributed (Pettersen 1987: 
30, see also p. 36-37).  
The last disagreement was regarding allocation of the benefit. Not only was there 
disagreement as to whether the old age pension was to be universal or means tested, but also 
other allocation suggestions were discussed. One suggestion was that people living in cities 
should receive a higher pension than people living in rural areas, because the cost of living 
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was higher in central areas. This could help uphold equality in purchasing power. Another 
suggestion was to differentiate the pension based on different social attributes, for example by 
differentiating the benefit based on previously earned income (Pettersen 1987: 31).   
5.4 Why a universal old age pension? 
On July 1st 1957 the bill was passed which made the old age pension universal and 
unconditional (Innst. O. XVIII 1957). This was almost unanimously passed by parliament, 
with only two votes from Communist Party (NKP) representatives not in agreement with all 
aspects of the reform. All the political parties, except for the Communist Party, had removing 
the means test from the old age pension on their party programs before the national elections 
in 1953. Several of the “non-socialist” parties had already in 1936, when passing the first old 
age pension, argued that the pension should be universal and not means tested.  
The political parties’ joint program (“Fellesprogrammet”) from 1945 stated that the nation’s 
social policy was to move away from the system of poor relief. They agreed to move towards 
a joint national insurance scheme, based on rights rather than discretion, which was to cover 
old age, sickness, unemployment and disability. All parties agreed that a system had to be put 
in place, but how and when it was to be done became an issue the parties did not agree on 
(Fellesprogrammet 1945).  
By the end of WWII, the level of the old age pensions had only been increased by an 
insignificant amount since 1937. Inflation had increased by about 60 percent (Innst. O. nr. 166 
1946: 187) during, and because of the war, decreasing the real value of the pension with about 
38 percent (Pettersen 1987: 31). The goal of being able to live a decent life on only the old 
age pension was further from reality now than before the war. The initial request for 
increasing the pension came from the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP), but politicians 
from all parties soon wanted to increase the level of the old age pension. Even though there 
was no opposition to increasing the level of the pension, they only managed to pass an 
increase of 20 percent the year after the war. In 1946, an additional increase was passed, 
increasing the level of the pension by 25 percent for the city municipalities, and 38 percent for 
the rural municipalities (Innst. O. nr. 166 1946). The rates however were still not close to 
being at an adequate level. Even though all parties wanted to increase the level of the old age 
pension, there was no increase in the pensions in the year of 1947. The incumbent Labour 
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Government gave priority to creating a disability pension before increasing the resources to 
the old age pension11 (Pettersen 1987: 31, Kuhnle 1991).  
There were now three different priorities in different sections of the state. The Labour 
Government wanted to include new groups in to the social security system, creating new 
benefits for the disabled and for widows. The Social Affairs Committee in Parliament wanted 
to give priority to increase the old age pensions. The opposition parties, mainly the “non-
socialist” bloc wanted to remove the means test from the old age pension. This was mainly a 
disagreement on priorities, all parties agreed that all of the mentioned changes were important 
and had to be done, but they disagreed on what was to be done first.  
5.4.1 The Governments plan for a national social insurance scheme 
The Labour government and the Ministry of Social Affairs presented a white paper 
(Stortingsmelding) in 1948, presenting their plan for the development of the national social 
insurance scheme (St. mld. nr. 58 1948). The main theme of the document was to lay out a 
plan for the creation of a national insurance scheme, which was to cover the whole population 
with common administrative body and a simple form of financing. The purpose of the 
national insurance scheme was to secure the whole population against loss of income. By 
expanding these benefits to cover larger parts of the population for different needs, they could 
reduce the importance of the disliked poor relief system.  
The plans in the white paper were drawn from the work in the Child Benefit committee of 
1938, but also from the program from the International Labour Organization, from their 
conference in Philadelphia in 1944 (International Labour Organization 1944). They also 
looked in to the National Insurance Act of 1946 from Britain, which was based on the 
Beveridge plan, and New Zealand’s Social Security Act of 1938. The Swedish reforms and 
proposals on social policy was also a source of inspiration (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 4).   
On the International Labour Organization’s conference in Philadelphia in 1944, there was 
drafted a number of social policy statements that should serve as an inspiration for forming 
countries’ social policies. The Philadelphia declaration states among other things that one of 
the main goals of the organization is “the extension of social security measures to provide a 
basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care” (International 
Labour Organization 1944: 3).  
                                                          
11
 The disability pension did not get introduced until 1961.  
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The Governments’ white paper recommended that the benefits for sickness, unemployment 
and work-related injuries should be set at a level in relation to the recipient’s previous income, 
giving income maintenance for these benefits. The level of the old age pension and invalidity 
pension should be set at a level in relation to a regular wage for an industrial worker, 
providing a minimum level for these benefits. They recommended that the cost of these social 
benefits was to be covered by the recipients, the employers, and the tax payers. This had to be 
done in a way which was fair to the recipients, and did not cause hardships for people in 
financial difficulty, and did not place too much of a burden on the employers. The remainder 
of the costs was to be financed through general taxation (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 5). 
The Ministry of Social Affairs also discussed the economic environment in relation to the 
extension of benefits. They argued that extensions and improvements of social benefits should 
be done at a time when GDP was increasing, as had always been the case in Norway. It was 
regarded as easier to pass new expensive legislation when the economy was growing. At the 
same time they also argued that the total cost of extending benefits would not be as high as 
the cost of the direct payments. Because the new old age pension and disability pension would 
replace the existing poor relief system (forsorgsvesenet). The money spent on those schemes 
could be redirected to the new policy schemes. The cost of the new social policy proposals 
would be higher than the existing ones, and passing new social policy would come at the 
expense of either the tax payers, or at the expense of investments in e.g. infrastructure. At a 
time when the country’s productive capacity and employment was at its fullest potential, the 
option of increasing productivity was not present. But the Ministry of Social Affairs stressed 
that the additional cost as a part of GDP would be minimal (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 5-6). At the 
same time, the new social policies would provide benefits in a much more gratifying way. The 
new system would provide benefits as a right, instead of the poor relief system which was 
based on a subjective account of whether and how much help was needed (St. mld. nr. 58 
1948: 5). 
The Labour Government had no doubt that the country could afford to expand its social 
policies. The social policy proposals had to be seen as a demand for social justice, and would 
not require a major redistribution of income, or even a major increase in national expenses. 
Additionally, providing the poor with better benefits and higher purchasing power would 
stimulate the economy by increasing purchases and international trade (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 
5-6).  
74 
 
The next issue that was discussed in the white paper was if the benefits should provide a 
minimum standard or income maintenance. They argued that it could easily be questioned 
whether it would be necessary to increase taxes for higher income groups to secure their 
income level if they were to lose their source of income. This could just as easily be done 
voluntarily through e.g. private insurance companies. The Ministry of Social Affairs argued 
that it would be fairer to increase the level of the minimum benefit, instead of providing a 
higher benefit for higher income groups. The problem with a flat rate minimum benefit was 
that some groups could earn less than the set benefit level. With the income inequalities that 
existed in Norway at that time, it was hard to find a level that was satisfying for all groups. In 
some cases e.g. the sick benefit and the unemployment benefit, the recipient could have some 
influence as to whether he qualified for the benefit or was able to work. If the benefit level 
was set higher than a low wage, this could cause disincentives to work (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 
7-8).  
The ministry of Social Affairs decided to divide the new social security system in two main 
groups: these were “income benefits” and “pension benefits”. They argued that the preferred 
solution would be to provide the same level of benefits to all recipients. They did however see 
that a flat rate benefit would be difficult in a country with high income inequalities. Those 
with high incomes would receive a lot less than their usual income, which could lead to 
dissatisfaction. Those with low incomes could increase their income by receiving benefits, 
making it profitable not to work. They decided to follow the system that already existed, by 
having both, but on different kinds of benefits.  
The income maintenance system was used for short-term benefits such as sick-, and 
unemployment benefits, and the flat rate system was used for long-term benefits, such as the 
disability- or old age pensions. The deciding arguments were that the standard of living 
should be upheld for short-term benefits, because it was hard for someone to quickly adjust in 
the short term, and running expenses should be covered for these kinds of situations. But for 
the long-term however, the recipients have a better opportunity to align to a lower standard of 
living, and adjust their expenses according to the minimum standard benefit (St. mld. nr. 58 
1948: 8-9).  
The recommendation from the Ministry of Social Affairs was to continue administering the 
old age pension as it was, with a flat rate benefit for everyone, only adjusted by the stipulated 
living costs in the area of residence. This model was recommended for all benefits classified 
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as “pension benefits”, those which were long-term. The old age pension set the standard for 
the other long term benefits (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 36).   
The deduction rules for the old age pension were also discussed in the Governments white 
paper (St. mld. nr. 58 1948), discussing who should be qualified and how much additional 
income one could earn while receiving a pension, and whether the means test should be 
removed or not. They decided that in principle, they were in favour of removing the means 
test all together, making the old age pension universal and unconditional. They argued that the 
simplest arrangement would be to remove all deduction rules in the old age pension and 
disability pension, so that these pensions would be paid to everyone who met the conditions 
regarding old age or disability without the need for a means test. This would be to continue 
the principle of universalism, introduced with the child benefit act of 1946.  
The main reason for wanting to remove the means test was socio-political, since such an 
arrangement would emphasize the nature of the pension as a right for all members of society. 
In addition, this would have great administrative advantages. They argued that a substantial 
amount of work in both the municipal and state agencies administering the old age pensions 
went to the calculation and revision of pension rights and the size of the individual pensions. 
The administrative work needed to perform the means test and control the recipients could be 
substantially reduced if the pension was made unconditional. In addition to those advantages, 
removing the means test would also give the recipients of the old age pensions a better 
incentive to keep working after the pension age, to increase their total income. If they lost 
their state pension by earning their own income, it would reduce their incentive to work. If the 
means test was removed, it would encourage the working population to save up money for 
their own retirement, without it affecting their eligibility to receive an old age pension from 
the state in the future (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 43).  
Even with these arguments in mind, the Ministry of Social Affairs concluded that they had to 
keep the means test in the old age pension. Removing the means test would cause an increase 
of 30 percent of the expenses. The Ministry wanted to introduce a general disability pension 
before spending more money on the old age pension. They also argued that before the means 
test could be removed, the level of the old age pension should be increased, so that those who 
only had the pension to live on would have a better living standard (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 43).  
They also wanted to centralize the administration of the pension system, place all social 
programs under the administration of one institution, and simplify the rules of the system. 
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This would make the benefit system both easier to administer and to understand. The general 
direction of social policy, away from the poor relief system and towards a comprehensive 
social security system would reduce the administration’s subjective assessment of the level 
and form of poor relief needed. The Child Benefit was used as an example of how the rules 
could be made simple and effective, and this was the direction the Government wanted to go 
with all social policy (St. mld. nr. 58 1948: 57).  
5.4.2 Parliamentary debate on pensions may 12 th 1948 
The Ministry of Social Affairs later that year proposed a change in the old age pension act, 
based on their white paper. They proposed a change in the regulations regarding the deduction 
rules, in effect making it easier to determine how much one could earn without getting a 
reduced pension. This made it easier for the recipients to understand, and easier for the 
administration to manage. They also proposed a small increase in the level of the pension. 
When this was proposed in parliament May 12th 1948, there was a general discussion on the 
issue of old age pension. All of the non-socialist parties, the Conservatives, the Liberals, the 
Farmers and the Christian Democrats were at this point very clear that the means test had to 
be removed (Pettersen 1987: 32). 
The leader of the Social Affairs Committee in Parliament, Djupvik (V), argued that the means 
test had to be removed, and that the old age pension scheme would not be fair and reasonable 
until this was done. Although there were many reasons for removing the means test in the old 
age pension, he focused mainly on the disincentives for personal savings. It was not 
reasonable that a person who saved up for his old age privately should be punished for this by 
not being eligible for a pension. Although many people could find it wrong that people who 
were wealthy and had large incomes should receive the same pension as someone who was 
poor, he argued that the only right solution was to give them a pension, and if they so chose to 
decline it, everyone should be thankful. He concluded that the old age pension had to become 
universal, and be based on the same principle as the child benefit as soon as possible, but 
stated that he did not think it was possible at the time (Stortingsforhandlinger 1948: 216). 
Representative Olav Versto (AP) argued that the means test had to remain in place, because 
the cost of removing it would be too high. Removing the means test should not be done, 
because it would lead to large expenses for the state. He argued that the first priority had to be 
to raise the level of the pension for those who needed it the most. He stated that removing the 
means test should be saved for a later time, when the state was better economically suited to 
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provide a proper pension for everyone (Stortingsforhandlinger 1948: 217). This 
argumentation was supported by Communist Party representative Andersen 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1948: 218).  
Moseid (B) argued that allowing recipients of the pension to continue working and earning an 
income while receiving a pension, thereby giving them stronger incentives to work, would 
have positive effects on the national economy. He said that both he and his party had been in 
favour of a universal old age pension ever since a pension was introduced, and that it would 
be principally right to pay the pension to everyone, regardless of wealth or income. He argued 
that for the people it would be better if the old age pension was paid in the same manner as 
the child benefit, so everyone could receive a pension. The means testing of the old age 
pension continued to bear a resemblance to the old poor relief system (Stortingsforhandlinger 
1948: 221). He said that it was dangerous for a society to remove a person’s private interest in 
saving money for his or her own old age. He also argued that the cost of removing the means 
test would not be too expensive, because progressive taxation would ensure that those with 
the highest incomes would pay most of the pension back through taxation, and the lower 
income groups would not be greatly affected economically. Finally, even if removing the 
means test would cost more on the state budget, on the national level, it would have positive 
economic effects, because people could continue working even after the pension age, and 
contribute to increased production and through taxation (Stortingsforhandlinger 1948: 221).  
The Minister of Social Affairs, Sven Oftedal (AP) argued that the cost of improving the 
deduction rules and increasing the level of the pension would come at a great economic 
expense. It would be wrong to extend the pension to new groups of people by removing the 
means test without first increasing the level of the pension, because the levels were not set at a 
decent level and had to be increased. He argued that the means test had to be gradually 
removed, and the levels of the pension had to be increased. By gradually increasing the levels 
of the pension, and gradually include higher income groups into the pension scheme, the 
means test could be removed when the two levels were closer (Stortingsforhandlinger 1948: 
224).  
The proposal led to a lengthy discussion on removing the means test. The parties on “the left”, 
notably the Communist Party and the Labour Party argued for increasing the levels of the 
pension in the short term, and removing the means test in the long term. The parties on “the 
right”, notably the Farmers Party and the Liberal Party argued for removing the means test as 
78 
 
soon as possible. Although no agreement on the means test was agreed to, the proposed bill 
was passed unanimously (Innst. O. VIII 1948).  
5.4.3 The opposition parties push for change 
Both in 1950 and in 1951 two representatives from the Farmers Party, Moseid (B) and Borgen 
(B), proposed to remove the differentiation between the rural and central municipalities, and a 
significant lightening of the means test. The Farmers Party mainly represented people from 
rural areas, and therefore had an obvious interest in raising the level of their pensions by 
removing the division between rural and central areas. Both the pensions from the state and 
from the municipalities were higher in central areas. This allowed them to both receive a 
higher pension, but also allowing them to earn more additional income (Pettersen 1987: 36).  
They suggested a much less restrictive means test12.This would allow the current recipients of 
the pension to have a larger additional income without reductions in their pensions, and it 
would extend the coverage to new income groups. The aim of the proposal was to come one 
step closer to the full removal of the means test. However, the Labour government, with its 
majority in parliament was not willing to go that far. The proposal did not pass. In 1952 four 
members of parliament from the Liberal Party proposed a full removal of the means test, they 
were Neri Valen (V), Paul Ingebretsen (V), Bent Røiseland (V) and Erling Vindenes (V) (Ot. 
prp. nr. 52 1952). This proposal did not pass either.  
The Labour government had a year later agreed that they should remove the differentiation of 
the level of the old age pension in rural and central areas. On December 27th 1951 they 
appointed a committee to investigate some of the issues regarding the old age pension that had 
been brought up in discussions in parliament (Ot. prp. nr. 52 1952). The committee had a 
proposition ready a few months later. The issues they had studied were the removal of the 
differentiation between rural and central municipalities, and the different issues related to the 
income limit and wealth limit to being eligible for an old age pension. The committee 
recommended removing the differentiation between different areas. Very few of the rural 
municipalities had provided any additional pensions on top of the minimum level, while most 
of the central municipalities had done so. The differentiation was initially introduced to 
compensate for the higher living costs in central areas. However, experience now showed that 
                                                          
12
 They proposed to increase the level of additional income that was allowed to earn while receiving a pension to 
1000 NOK for everyone, and raising the level of personal wealth that was allowed be increased from 6000 NOK  
to 10 000 NOK Pettersen, Per Arnt (1987): Pensjoner, penger, politikk: fra billig forsorg til dyre trygder. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget.. 
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most central areas compensated for this on the local level, while the rural municipalities were 
not in an economic position to provide additional pensions.  
The second main reason was that the members of the committee did not find it reasonable that 
the state should provide less economic assistance to the poorer rural municipalities, who could 
not afford to increase the level of the pensions, while providing more economic assistance to 
the central municipalities who had a better economic standing. By equalizing the amount of 
the pensions everywhere, the rural areas would receive the same amount of grants to provide 
the pension as the central areas. They also found that the cost of living was no longer much 
higher in central areas of the country than in rural parts. In addition to this, the committee 
proposed an increase in the level of the pension, because they were still very low. They 
proposed 1200 NOK for single recipients and 1800 NOK for married couples. These levels 
were proposed for all parts of the country (Ot. prp. nr. 52 1952).  
The arguments in the proposal for removing the means test were that the strict means test 
created a strong disincentive to work for people over the pension age, which were still willing 
and able to work. The growing number of people over the age of 70 would make it necessary 
for them to work longer. The only way to get the pensioners to stay in the workforce after the 
age of 70 was to remove the means test, and allow them to earn additional money without 
losing their pension rights. Other arguments found in the report were that the means test 
discouraged personal savings, and that people who had saved up for their old age should not 
be punished for it. The existing rules for the pension discouraged private pension schemes and 
corporate pension plans, because these would count as income, and thereby disqualify people 
from the state pension plan. In addition to all these advantages, removing the means test 
would make the old age pension scheme more just (Ot. prp. nr. 52 1952).  
The committee stated that in principle, they agreed that the means test should be completely 
removed, and a pension should be provided to everyone who meets the age requirement. 
However, they could not recommend this at the time, because of the large cost attached to the 
proposal13. They concluded that in the coming years, they should focus on improving the 
minimum pensions, and allowing a higher additional income than what was allowed at the 
time. The committee did recommend increasing the amount of money one could earn in 
addition to a full pension from the equivalent of 60 % of the value of  pension to 100 % of the 
                                                          
13
 The Social committee in parliament calculated that a complete removal of the means test at the current levels 
(1023 and 1152), would have a total cost of 90 million NOK. Although this did not take into account the amount 
returned through direct and indirect taxation, or administrative savings.  
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value of the pension14 (Ot. prp. nr. 52 1952: 16). They also decided that there was no need to 
increase the level of savings or wealth a person could have, while receiving a full pension15. 
The committee agreed that means testing had some negative effects in different ways, and that 
it should be removed some time in the future, but that the current conditions did not allow for 
it (Ot. prp. nr. 52 1952).  
The recommendations from the committee lead to some significant changes in the old age 
pension. On the 13th of June 1952, the Ministry of Social Affairs fronted a proposal in 
parliament (Innst. O. XIII 1952). The proposal had five suggestions: 1) increasing the level of 
the pension 2) increasing the income limit for reductions in the pension 3) increasing the 
wealth limit 4) changing how the pensions were regulated 5) removing the condition of 
citizenship.   
The recommendations from the committee were kept with very few changes. This meant that 
the differentiation between rural and central areas was removed, so the pension was now the 
same level in the whole country. The level of the pension was changed to 1200 NOK for 
singles and 1800 NOK for married couples. The means test was also made less restrictive; 
setting the additional income allowed to the equivalent of 100 percent of value of the pension. 
The last, but important, change was that the requirement of being a Norwegian citizen to 
receive a pension was removed. Because people who came to Norway as refugees and asylum 
seekers had a special need for assistance, they should also have the right to a pension. In 
addition, people who had moved to Norway and had the same responsibilities as Norwegian 
citizens, such as paying taxes, should also have the right to receive the same benefits. The 
Ministry continued the line the Labour Party had showed earlier, that in principle, the means 
testing of the old age pension should be removed, but other matters were more important to do 
first, like introducing a disability pension and increasing the levels of the pensions. The 
proposal passed unanimously (Innst. O. XIII 1952).  
5.4.4 The long-term program for 1954-57 
In 1953 the Labour Government presented their «long term program» (langtidsprogrammet) 
for 1954-57 (St. mld. nr. 62 1953). This program had a section on the old age pension, 
containing a study into the cost of removing the means test. They had found that removing the 
means test in the old age pension would cost about 66 million NOK at the current levels, and 
                                                          
14
 The pensions were proposed increased to 1200 NOK for singles and 1800 NOK for married couples. The 
amount of other income they could receive without having their pension reduced was increased to 100 percent of 
the value of the pension, making it 1200 NOK for single recipients, and 1800 NOK for married couples.  
15
 The wealth level had been at 6000 NOK since 1936.   
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1/5 of this amount would return directly to the state through taxation. The Labour Party 
continued to argue that raising the level of the pensions were more important than to remove 
the means test, because the levels were still far too low.  
For the period 1954 – 1957 they had plans to gradually raise the minimum level of the 
pensions to 2000 NOK for single recipients and 3000 NOK for married couples (St. mld. nr. 
62 1953: 212). When this level was reached, they would gradually change the eligibility rules 
by increasing the amount of income the recipients could earn and still be eligible, until the 
means test could eventually be completely removed. They concluded that raising the 
minimum level of the pension was one of the most pressing social concerns, and that each 
state budget in the period would raise the level of the pension as much as they found possible. 
But they did not commit to a time schedule, and did not guarantee that the goals would be 
reached in the mentioned period (St. mld. nr. 62 1953). 
The following year, Parliaments Social Committee (Sosialkomiteen) proposed an addition to 
the Governments long term program for 1954-57 (Innst. O. I. 1954). The Social Committee in 
Parliament at the time consisted of 16 representatives, one from the Christian Democratic 
Party (Krf), ten from the Labour Party (AP), two from the Conservative Party (H), two from 
the Farmers Party (B), and one from the Liberal Party (V) (Stortinget 2013). The proposition 
was to commit the Government to reach their goals from St. mld. Nr. 62 (1953) by the end of 
the electoral period in 1957. In addition, they proposed a binding agreement to remove the 
means test from the old age pension when this was achieved. The proposition passed, and all  
parties agreed to gradually remove the means test over this set period of time (Innst. O. I. 
1954). 
This showed that there still was willingness to compromise between the political parties of 
Norway. The Farmers Party, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party had all put on hold 
their demand to remove the means test as soon as possible, and agreed to the gradual removal 
of the means test, until it could be completely removed in 1957. The Labour Government also 
got their will of increasing the minimum level of the pensions before the means test was 
removed.  
Later that same year the Minister of Social Affairs, Rakel Seweriin (AP), stated that if the 
level of the pension was increased to 2000/3000 NOK as proposed, removing the means test 
would cost 94 million NOK. This would be  20 million NOK more than the cost of increasing 
the level of the pensions without removing the means test (Stortingsforhandlinger 1954: 43). 
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This statement caused worry amongst some of the opposition, who believed this could cause 
the Government to not remove the means test as agreed, because it would be too costly to 
remove the means test after the rates had been raised (e.g. Stortingsforhandlinger 1954: 44). 
Assurances were made that the agreement was to be upheld by the Labour Party, even though 
some members of the Labour Government were still not entirely convinced that the means test 
should be removed as soon as the agreement stated (Stortingsforhandlinger 1954).  
5.4.5 The impatient Conservative Party  
In 1955, members of Parliament Olsen and Riise, on behalf of the Conservative Party, 
proposed to remove the means test from the old age pension from January 1
st
 1956 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1955). This proposal broke with the common agreement to remove 
the means test in 1957. Although they did not get any support for their proposal, it caused a 
comprehensive debate in parliament about breaking the common agreement.  
Representatives from the Conservative Party argued for removing the means test in the old 
age pension immediately. Claudia Olsen (H), the main speaker on the topic for the 
Conservative party, argued that it was nothing new for any of the parties in parliament to talk 
about removing the means test in the old age pension, but that other parties would never 
actually pass the bill. She listed many arguments in favour of removing the means test. Firstly, 
if the pension system was to be seen as just, the means test had to be removed. Means testing 
was stigmatizing towards the recipients because it was aimed at the poor, and it was unfair 
that hard working people who had contributed to society through taxation should not receive a 
pension in their old age. Secondly, removing the means test would reduce the administrative 
work related to the pension. The complicated regulations and the means test caused a lot of 
work both for the local administration, but also for the central administration. Thirdly, a 
means test in the old age pension had negative effects for corporate and private pension plans. 
If the means test was removed, the recipients could receive other pensions in addition to the 
national pension (Stortingsforhandlinger 1955: 216-217). She also argued that removing the 
means test would not greatly benefit the rich, because most of the benefit would be directly 
returned through taxation. The example of the child benefit was used, to show that a universal 
benefit did not greatly benefit the rich, because most of the amount was returned through 
taxation (Stortingsforhandlinger 1955: 216-217).  
Representative Erling Petersen (H) from the Conservative Party accused the Labour Party of 
not being completely honest in their promise for removing the means test. The same 
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arguments the Labour Party had used to postpone removing the means test up until then could 
just as easily be used in the future. Removing the means test would give people the 
opportunity to continue actively in the work force, to benefit both themselves and society. If 
people over the age of 70 could remain in their jobs and still receive their pensions, more of 
them would probably choose to do so. Many elderly people found it difficult to not to be able 
to participate in active, income-generating work. There should be no obligation for the elderly 
to do such work, but those who wanted to should not be punished for doing so by being 
refused a state pension. Removing the means test would prove to be a very valuable reform 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1955: 225-226). He also argued that although the reductions in 
administrative costs would not cover the additional cost of removing the means test, it would 
be beneficial for the economy in a socio-economic perspective by allowing more people to 
participate in the workforce, thereby increasing the total productive resources 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1955: 225-226). With these thoughts in mind, they argued that the 
means test could be removed immediately from the old age pension, without using the 
resources that were needed for the other social policy reforms.  
Representatives from the Labour Party argued for the importance of increasing the levels of 
the pensions, and criticized the Conservative party for breaking out of a common agreement. 
They also accused the Conservative Party for trying to take all the credit for removing the 
means test, even though it had been a common agreement between all the parties 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1955). The Labour Party also got support from members of the 
Farmers Party.  
Representative Løbak (AP) argued that although there were many good reasons for removing 
the means test, he could not accept that a pension should be given to wealthy people with high 
incomes before a proper pension was provided for those who were poor. If they were to spend 
70 million NOK on the pension, it should benefit those who were worst off, and not those 
who had other means of supporting themselves (Stortingsforhandlinger 1955: 214-215).  
Torvald Wirstad (B) from the Farmers Party stated that for his party, removing the means test 
from the old age pension had been a main issue for many years. However, when all the parties 
had come to an agreement to remove the means test in 1957, this agreement should be upheld 
by everyone (Stortingsforhandlinger 1955: 119). The Farmers Party regarded it very 
regrettable that the Conservative Party had broken out of the common agreement. Although 
the Farmers Party did not support the Conservative Party’s proposal to remove the means test 
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from 1956, they did strongly support removing the means test. Because making the pension 
universal would stimulate workforce participation, and it would stimulate personal savings. 
Some people regarded removing the means test to be social retrenchment, because benefits 
were given to people who did not need them. The Farmers Party regarded removing the 
means test to be social progress, because the pension should be a return of contributions made 
during working age. The pension should therefore be a right of citizenship and not aimed at 
the poor (Stortingsforhandlinger 1955: 120).   
In the 1955 debate, it was clear that the Labour Party wanted to postpone removing the means 
test in the old age pension, and the Christian Democratic Party was in agreement with them. 
The Conservative Party proposed to remove the means test immediately, which also the 
Liberal Party and the Farmers Party supported. However, the Liberal Party and the Farmers 
Party did not support the proposal from the Conservative party, because of the existing 
agreement from 1954. They regarded the agreement from 1954 as binding, and therefore 
supported the Labour party in this debate. The proposal from the Conservative party was not 
passed, and the common agreement from 1954 was still in place (Stortingsforhandlinger 
1955).  
5.4.6 A universal old age pension 
In 1956 the minimum pensions were increased to 1860 NOK for singe recipients and 2790 
NOK for married couples (Innst. O. nr. 48 1956). The plan to reach 2000 / 3000 NOK by 
1957 was within reach. The Ministry of Social Affairs proposed to increase the minimum 
pensions to the mentioned levels on March 8th 1957. The proposal was passed the same day 
(Ot. prp. nr. 49 1957). The only thing remaining now was to remove the means test. The 
proposal to remove the means test passed on July 1st 1957, but the means test remained in 
place until January 1st 1959. Some had wanted this reform since the old age pension was 
introduced in 1936. Only one political party did not support the proposal, the Communist 
Party, who stated that they could not agree to remove the means test until the pensions were 
raised to a higher level16.  
The final proposal raised the levels of the old age pension to 2208 NOK for single recipients 
and 3312 NOK for married couples (Innst. O. XVIII 1957). This was part of a comprehensive 
reform of all social policies. The Ministry of Social Affairs had in Ot. prp. nr.59 (1957) argued 
why they supported removing the means test. In addition to the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
                                                          
16
 They wanted to keep the means test in place until the levels of the pension was raised to 3000 NOK for singles 
and 4500 NOK for married couples.  
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many other organizations had a chance to state their opinion in Ot.prp.nr.59 (1957). These 
were the Ministry of Finance (Finansdepartementet), Ministry of Municipalities and labour 
(Kommunal-, og arbeidsdepartementet), the Norwegian City Association (Norsk byforbund), 
the Norwegian District Association (Norsk herredsforbund), and the Norwegian Life 
Insurance Company’s Association (Den norske livsforsikringsselskapers Forening), The 
Insurance Council (Forsikringsrådet), The Seamen’s Union (Pensjonstrygden for sjømenn), 
The Workers Union (Arbeidernes faglige landsorganisasjon), Norwegian Employers 
Association (Norsk arbeidsgiverforening), Ministry of Fisheries (Fiskeridepartementet), 
Norwegian Association for pensioners (Norsk forbund for trygdede og pensionister) and 
“Norsk trygdekasselag” (Ot. prp. nr. 59 1957).  
The recommendation from the Ministry of Social Affairs was to remove the means test from 
the old age pension. The reason for this was based on five main arguments. Firstly, that the 
existing program bore a resemblance to the old poor relief system when it is limited to those 
who have no other income. Secondly, the means test created a disincentive for people to save 
up for their own old age. Thirdly, the means test also created a disincentive for people over 
the pension age to work, because it could disqualify them from receiving a pension. In 
association with this, there were socioeconomic benefits of encouraging the elderly to 
continue working. Fourthly, the means test discouraged the creation of private insurance 
policies and company pensions, because employers did not want to pay pensions and relieve 
the state of this duty. Lastly, removing the means test would have large administrative benefits 
(Ot. prp. nr. 59 1957: 9).     
All of the mentioned organizations were in favour of removing the means test, except for 
“Norsk trygdekasselag”, The Ministry of Fisheries and the Norwegian Association for 
pensioners. They did not support the removal of the means test mainly because they regarded 
the proposed level of the universal pension to be too low, and that increasing the pensions 
should continue to have priority over removing the means test. Another objection to removing 
the means test was that it would be wrong, as long as it would mainly benefit those who were 
already wealthy or had large incomes. The means test should not be removed until other, more 
pressing social policies were introduced, such as the invalidity pension. None rejected the 
principle of removing the means test, only removing it at that time. (Ot. prp. nr. 59 1957).   
Representative Hølvold (NKP) proposed an alternative proposal, where the means test was 
kept in place until the level of the pension was raised to 3000 / 4500 NOK, and then removed 
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(Stortingsforhandlinger 1957: 460). This proposal did not pass, and only received two 
supportive votes. The proposal from the Social committee was passed with a very clear 
majority on all points, but the Communist Party voted “no” on the area removing the means 
test, and the area regarding the new method of financing the pension (Stortingsforhandlinger 
1957).  
Some members of parliament also had doubts towards the new old age pension, and its 
administration. Member of parliament Helge Seip (V) argued that with the new financing 
method, everyone who had an income of more than 6000 NOK would pay full contributions 
to the old age pension fund (Stortingsforhandlinger 1957: 463). If a married couple both had 
jobs and an income of more than 6000 NOK per year, they would both have to pay fees to the 
pension fund. However, because they were married, they would only receive one and a half 
full pensions, even though they had both paid full contributions to the pension fund. However, 
if they only had one income of over 12 000 NOK, they would only have to pay one pension 
fee. If they were not married, both would receive a full pension each even if they had not paid 
contribution fees. Seip argued that the right to a pension had to be universal and uniform, for 
all men and women, whether they were married or not, and without regard for previous earned 
income (Stortingsforhandlinger 1957). The Minister of Social Affairs, Harlem (AP), replied 
that there should be “no benefits for getting married” (Stortingsforhandlinger 1957: 467 (my 
translation)). He argued that it was more expensive to live alone than to live as a couple, so 
the total pension per person for a couple should be lower than the pension for a person living 
alone. Everyone who had an income should pay the pension fee, and those who did not have 
an income should not have to pay the fee (Stortingsforhandlinger 1957: 467). This would 
secure redistribution between those who worked and those who did not.  
The “non-socialist” parties seemed to be most content with the removal of the means test in 
the old age pension. Some of them had wanted this reform since the old age pension was 
introduced, and had worked for it ever since. Although all the parties in the Norwegian 
Parliament in principle agreed that the pension should be universal, removing the means test 
had never been the top priority for the Labour Party and the other “socialist” parties. They had 
preferred keeping the pension aimed at the worst off, and redistribute from the wealthy to the 
worst off.  The new old-age pension removed some of the redistributive effect from the rich to 
the poor, because of the way it was financed, and the main type of redistribution left was that 
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between those who had an income and those who did not have an income17 . The main 
benefactor in the new system was probably women, because most women did not work.  
5.5 Objections to a universal old age pension 
By the time the means test was removed in 1957, all parliamentary parties except for the 
Communist Party were in favour. Their main objection was that if more money was going to 
be spent on the old-age pension, it should go towards increasing the payments to the worst-
off, and not go towards payments to people who were wealthy or had high incomes. They also 
argued that there were “important social issues” to consider before removing the means test 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1957: 457). Further, Communist Party representative Hølvold argued 
that if the means test was removed, they could not afford to increase the pension further in the 
near future, making the conditions worse for the poorest as the cost of living was increasing. 
In earlier discussions, the main objections were that a universal old age pension would be too 
expensive, and that pensions would be given to people who do not need them 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1957: 457).  
The Labour party had managed to postpone making the pension universal by arguing for 
raising the level of the pension for those already eligible, instead of extending coverage to 
new groups. They also postponed removing the means test by arguing that it would be wrong 
to give a pension to those who did not need it, as long as the pensions were so small for those 
who did need it. There was very little resistance towards making the pension universal in 
1957, but some discussion on the funding of the pension.  
5.6 Summary: 
The old age pension may have been, and still is, one of the most important social policy areas 
in the Norwegian welfare state. The idea of a state organized old age pension has been around 
since the 1800’s, and it is still a much debated policy area. The history of the old age pension 
shows that it has been discussed widely, and strong opinions have been attached to it. There 
have been many debates as to how it should be financed, how it should be organized and who 
should be covered by it. Table 2 shows different proposals for an old age pension.  
 
 
                                                          
17
 Before 1957, the pension had been financed by a 2.1 % special tax on all income. After 1957, the pension was 
financed through a premium of 273 NOK. All incomes over 6000 NOK paid the full premium, incomes over 
4000 NOK paid 2/3 of the premium, and incomes over 2000 NOK paid 1/3. Incomes under 2000 NOK paid 
nothing.  
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TABLE 2 Different proposals for the old age pension 
All data collected from the sources referred to in chapter 5 
With regards to making the pension universal in Norway, all the political parties apart from 
the Communist Party seem to have been in agreement that a universal old age pension should 
be provided to everyone, regardless of other income and wealth. Although some showed more 
support for this ideal than others did. There have been many arguments in favour of removing 
the means test from the old age pension. It took many years, but in 1957, it was decided that 
all persons over the age of 70 should receive a pension regardless of other income and wealth. 
All parties agreed that making the pension universal was the simplest, most effective and most 
just solution, once the worst off had been lifted to an acceptable level. 
Year Who proposed it? The proposal Who supported it? / Did 
it pass? 
1936 Labour Government Strictly means tested on income and wealth All parties (unanimous) / 
Passed  
1948 Labour Government Simplifying the deduction rules (lightening 
the means test).  
Increasing the pension 
All parties (unanimous) / 
Passed  
1950 Farmers Party representatives 
Moseid & Borgen 
Remove the differentiation between rural 
areas / central areas. 
Lightening the means test. 
Farmers & Conservative 
Party representatives / 
Not passed 
1951 Farmers Party representatives 
Moseid & Borgen 
Removing the differentiation between rural / 
central areas. 
Increase income limit. 
Increase wealth limit. 
Farmers Party 
representatives / Not 
passed 
1952 Liberal Party representatives: 
Valen, Ingebregsten, Røiseland & 
Vindenes 
Removing the means test completely Liberal & Farmers Party 
representatives / Not 
passed 
1952 Labour Government Remove differentiation between rural / 
central areas. 
Increase pensions. 
Remove requirement of Norwegian 
citizenship. 
All parties (unanimous) / 
passed  
1953 Labour Government Long term plan for 1954-57: Gradually 
increase the pension, remove means test 
when set level was reached 
All parties (unanimous) / 
Passed 
1954 Social Committee Gradually increase the pensions to specified 
level, and then completely remove the 
means test by 1957.  
All parties apart from 
Communist Party 
representatives / Passed  
1955 Conservative representative Olsen  Remove the means test from January 1st 
1956.  
Conservative Party 
representatives  / Not 
passed 
1957 Communist Party representative 
Hølvold 
Means testing is continued until the pension 
levels have reached 3000/ 4500 NOK.  
Income limit is increased to 200 % of the 
pension.  
Communist Party 
representatives / Not 
passed 
1957 Social Committee Removes the means test completely. 
Universal old age pension.  
All parties, apart from 
Communist Party 
representatives / Passed  
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The arguments for making the pension universal have been the same almost every time the 
topic was debated. The same arguments have been put forth in different forms from different 
people. The main arguments were related to associations to the old poor relief system, because 
it was strictly aimed at the poor, and could be stigmatizing towards them. Second, the 
arguments related to administration, that the cost of controlling and checking applicants was 
more costly than paying a pension to everyone. Thirdly, the arguments related to the work and 
savings disincentives caused by the means test. Lastly, the strict means test discouraged 
corporations and companies to create professional pension plans, and it discourages the 
creation of private pension plans and insurance.  
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6. Comparing the arguments 
This chapter will compare the arguments found in the three different policy proposals studied 
in this thesis. My intention has been to identify and examine the arguments for a basic 
income, and the actual arguments set forth in favour of other universal policy proposals in 
Norway at the time of introduction. Table 3 gives an overview of the arguments in favour of a 
universal basic income, the arguments for the universal child benefit scheme which was 
introduced in Norway 1946 and the universal old age pension scheme which was introduced 
in 1957.  
During the data collection process and working with the material, I have grouped the 
arguments into four categories. These are: I) arguments related to freedom and justice, II) 
post-productivist, feminist, and green arguments, III) economic and administrative arguments 
and IV) arguments related to poverty and social justice. The categories are not mutually 
exclusive and some of the arguments may fit into more than one category, but this division is 
regarded as useful for this purpose.   
Which arguments which were put forth in the child benefit scheme and the pension scheme 
debates, have been or are also used in support for a basic income? It is clear that the literature 
surrounding basic income and the debates leading to the passing of the child benefit scheme 
and the universal old age pension scheme in Norway have discussed many of the same issues, 
using many of the same arguments. The table shows that the arguments in category I, related 
to freedom and justice are important in the basic income debate, but were not important in 
Norway during the discussions of the child benefit scheme and the old age pension scheme. 
The freedom and justice debates are one of the largest debates in the literature on basic 
income, and the literature on the topic continues to grow. These issues which are important in 
the debate on universalism today might not have been on the Norwegian political agenda in 
the 1940’s and 1950’s.   
The arguments in category II, related to post-productivism, green and feminist considerations 
are mainly found in the basic income debate. Post-productivist and green considerations are 
rather new themes on the political agenda, so there is no surprise when finding that these 
types of arguments are common in the basic income debate, but were not common in the two 
other cases. Some of the feminist arguments put forward in the basic income debate were also 
on the agenda in the other two debates, more so in the case of the child benefit scheme than 
the old-age pension scheme. This may be because the child-benefit scheme was to be given to 
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mothers and thereby giving women cash income independent of their husbands. In the period 
the child benefit discussion took place, married women usually did not work or have an 
income.  
TABLE 3 Comparing the arguments 
Types of 
arguments 
Arguments in favour of universal welfare benefits Basic 
income 
Child 
Benefit 
Old age 
pension 
I) Related to 
freedom & justice 
Normative liberal justifications  
Normative Republican justifications 
Marxist / Communitarian justifications 
Conservative justification 
Democratic justification 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II) Related to post-
productivism, 
green & feminism 
considerations 
Post productivist and green: 
Crisis in traditional models of family, collective actors and 
social security / welfare programs 
Move towards a more ecologically concerned society 
Full employment is undesirable and/or unattainable 
Gives value /recognition to unpaid work 
Option to live life outside of traditional employment 
Creates more innovative society 
Feminist: 
Improve economic independence/autonomy of women 
Reduce the “free-riding” of men on female unpaid labour 
Establish same income floor for men and women / reduce 
gender differentials in income support 
Gives women opportunity to stay home * 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
III) Related to 
economic & 
administrative 
considerations 
Full take-up / simpler system to understand 
Reduction of administrative costs 
Macroeconomic benefits  
Increase in school attendance and continuation 
Decrease levels of hospitalization 
Economic support is needed in all families 
Means-testing a disincentive to private saving and active 
work; removes savings/unemployment/poverty traps 
Dissatisfaction with existing welfare schemes 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
IV) Related to 
poverty and social 
justice  
Aversion to means test; avoids humiliating and 
stigmatizing testing and control of behaviour; dignity 
Social security as a right 
Remove  “social division of welfare” 
Improve bargaining power of employees vs. employers 
Reduce poverty 
Equality; universalism; everyone is treated equally 
Increased autonomy for individuals and families 
Post WWII vision of the “good society”/ Welfare state 
Worst-off will benefit  the most 
Foster support for public social security system 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
Sources: All information is collected from the sources referred to in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
*This argument is used both in favour and in opposition to the proposals.  
The largest opposition to the child benefit scheme also came from the feminist movement, 
who argued that they should rather focus on ways of getting more women into the workforce 
than making them stay home (see chapter 4.4). The feminist movement is still divided as to 
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whether cash benefits, or other social schemes making it easier for women to work more, is 
the best way to empower women.  
As the table shows, the arguments in both category III and IV are important in all three cases, 
and many of the arguments in these categories are found in the debates surrounding all three 
policies. In category III, related to economic and administrative considerations, the most 
important argument in all three cases was the reduction of administrative costs. The main 
gains of making benefits universal are that it makes the system both easier to understand for 
people at large, but also easier and cheaper to administer. Another important argument in all 
three debates is that means-testing creates a disincentive to work and save, and therefore has 
negative effects. Removing the means test also removes the poverty/unemployment/welfare- 
and savings-traps that can keep recipients from working and out of fear of losing their benefits 
or that the marginal tax rate is too high. In the debates surrounding the child benefit and the 
old age pension schemes, the “socialist” parties usually argued it would be cheaper to limit 
the benefits to those who were worse off, while the “non-socialist” parties thought it would be 
cheaper overall to make them universal, which would also imply giving benefits to the rich.   
The arguments in category IV, related to poverty and social justice also show many important 
similarities. The most important feature of these arguments is that it shows respect for 
equality and consideration for the worst off. In the debates surrounding all three proposals, 
there is agreement that means-testing can be stigmatizing and humiliating for the recipients, 
and that welfare schemes should be a social right rather than a hand-out to the poor and 
needy. There is also a general agreement that the principle of universalism is seen as the most 
socially just, and the simplest and most effective way of administrating social security 
schemes. This is especially clear in the debates leading to the passing of the universal old age 
pension, where all parties frequently mentioned that they “in principle” supported making the 
pension universal, but “not at this time”, because they would rather increase the minimum 
income level for the worst off before making the benefit universal. This was argued even by 
the representatives from the Communist party who voted against the proposal in 1957 
(Stortingsforhandlinger 1957). There also seems to be a common understanding that support 
for welfare schemes improves when they are universal, and not targeted at specific groups 
(Korpi & Palme 1998: 682).      
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7. Final remarks 
This thesis started with an introduction to the basic income idea, and has analysed and 
identified the arguments for a basic income, the universal child benefit in Norway, and the 
universal old age pension in Norway. My purpose has been to identify and examine the 
arguments which have been put forth in favour of a basic income scheme and the currently 
existing universal welfare schemes in Norway, at the time of their introduction. The goal has 
been to provide a comparison of the arguments in the three proposals to contribute towards 
debate and knowledge on the topic of basic income in Norway. This chapter will mark the end 
of the study with some concluding remarks, some thoughts on the contribution of the thesis, 
and suggestions for further research.  
7.1 Conclusion 
The answer to the research question “What are the arguments used to promote a universal 
basic income, and how do they compare to the arguments leading to the introduction of other 
universal income schemes in Norway?” is that there are many arguments used to promote a 
basic income, and some of them are similar to the arguments used to promote other universal 
welfare schemes which have been introduced in Norway. The results show many similarities 
between the arguments put forth in support of a basic income, and in favour of the two other 
schemes studied in this thesis. Most clearly the arguments are similar in two areas: arguments 
related to economic and administrative considerations, and arguments related to poverty and 
social justice.  
The arguments for universal policies in the Norwegian historical cases both include strong 
normative ideas about social justice, equality, solidarity and human dignity. All political 
parties in Norway agreed to the goal of developing universal welfare programs after WWII, as 
manifested in their Joint Programme (Fellesprogrammet 1945). After WWII Norwegian 
politicians expressed a deep dissatisfaction with the poor relief system, which was 
stigmatizing and paternalistic, and social security as a right became a goal for all parties. 
These values of human dignity, equality and social justice are also well manifested in the 
basic income literature. Many of the arguments in all three policy proposals are related to the 
negative effects of means testing. The means test along with the asset test is argued in all three 
cases to cause work disincentives, personal savings disincentives, welfare traps, 
stigmatization, paternalistic relationships, and unfairness. The negative effects of means 
testing and of targeting social policy at the poor represent the core considerations in favour of 
universal benefits.  
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The difference between the child benefit, the old age pension and basic income is that the first 
two are aimed at people who are not expected to contribute to society. Basic income is aimed 
at the entire population, but able bodied people of working age are expected to work and pay 
taxes. If an option was made for them to stop working, many would regard this as unfair, as 
well as economically impossible. The question of whether a policy can be afforded is not only 
strictly a budgetary concern, but also a political concern. Many new social policies have been 
objected to because of the expected cost, but they have been affordable after introduction. The 
history of the old age pension and child benefit studied in this thesis is an example of this. 
They indicate that the cost objection can be outweighed by political concerns.  
The question of whether society should provide benefits for people who do not need them, or 
do not deserve them, cannot be answered here. The purpose of this thesis was not to conclude 
whether basic income is a preferable proposal for Norway or not. That discussion I leave to 
the politicians. The clearest differences in the arguments identified in this study could be on 
the account that the two Norwegian debates took place in 1946 and 1957, and the 
circumstances and political environment has changed a lot since then. For example post-
productivist, feminist and green concerns are a lot higher on the political agenda in Norway 
now than it was in the 1940’s and 50’s. The “work line” in Norwegian social policy is also 
more prominent now than it was in the 1940’s and 1950’s.  
7.2 Contribution of the thesis and suggestions for further research 
The basic income idea has been mentioned in a few government documents and reports, but it 
has not been researched in detail by Norwegian governments. The few times it has been 
mentioned, it has been briefly. In most of the reports, it is recommended to do some research 
on the topic, because it potentially can have positive effects. But the Norwegian governments 
generally do not find the proposal interesting because it does not fit with the strong focus of 
the “work line” in Norwegian social policy (Fløtten et al. 2006: 17). This thesis has 
contributed to an understanding of the basic income idea, and the arguments used to justify 
basic income. This exercise can provide a more informed basis for discussions of the 
possibility, likelihood or desirability of basic income in Norway.  
Following other reports (eg. Fløtten et al. 2011, ECON 2001), I would suggest that more 
research be done on basic income in Norway, and what effects a basic income could have on 
the labour market, for poverty reduction, macroeconomic effects, including potential effects 
on health and education, as well as other socioeconomic effects. The theoretical aspects of 
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basic income have been studied and discussed in detail, but the potential for empirical 
experiments and pilot projects are great. Basic income is argued to have potential effects on 
many aspects of society, so there are many possibilities for empirical studies if the 
opportunity arises for more large scale pilot projects. A more open question which could be 
asked is whether universal welfare benefits have a future in Norway. Although universal 
benefits have always been popular in Norway, is this still the case? And are potential new 
benefits going to be universal in nature? These topics should be questions for future research.  
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